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Aegis readiness is an increasing concern as ships age, Navy budgets shrink, and potential 
adversaries make strides toward combat power parity in diverse regions around the 
world. Keys to combat effectiveness are materiel readiness and crew proficiency. Live 
fire missile exercises are a proven way to gauge the former while contributing to the 
latter, but the use of combat missiles for this purpose is both expensive and depletes the 
inventory on hand should conflict break out. 
This study explores the feasibility, required functionality, and costs involved in 
bringing a reusable missile system to the fleet from a systems engineering perspective. 
This system would notionally allow a greater number of live fire exercises while 
simultaneously reducing the cost required to do so. By recognizing a fleet need, bringing 
in stakeholders who stand to benefit from such a concept and applying analysis to a high-
level systems structure, recommendations and topics for further study were generated. 
These aim to further advance the concept of a recoverable test missile for use in 
proficiency firing events. 
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As Aegis surface combatants age, maintaining both materiel readiness and personnel 
proficiency is a top priority. This thesis proposes a novel solution that would allow fleet 
live-firing exercises to be increased, while simultaneously reducing the cost of doing so. 
This solution, the Surrogate Test Missile (STM), was selected from multiple alternatives 
to address the problem of increasing readiness. A systems engineering process was 
tailored to the problem, under the constraints of the selected alternative’s conceptual 
nature, and was applied throughout the thesis effort. This process model draws on the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process as well, and allows for 
integration of the work done here with future work on the same subject. 
To frame the problem, the alternatives were discussed with various stakeholders 
across the country, both within the Navy and within industry and academia. The input 
gathered from the stakeholders was refined into effective needs. Analysis of the 
stakeholder effective needs was then applied to a refinement of the problem statement. 
The scope of the report was then defined, based on both stakeholder needs and limitations 
and constraints imposed by the timeline and resources available. Stakeholder needs were 
also translated into system needs. The effective needs determined to be key drivers for 
STM development were safety, cost effectiveness, and the ability to verify readiness. 
To begin to define the required functionality of the STM a series of concepts of 
operations (CONOPS) were developed. These define the intended usage of the STM, and 
include considerations for different functional solutions. The initial CONOPS were then 
expanded through the use of both scenarios and vignettes to examine desired responses, 
further identify required functionality, and expand upon the initial CONOPS. These were 
all then distilled into a design reference mission (DRM), which serves as a baseline for 
potential future test and evaluation. The DRM, as described, lays out the expected 
conditions and actions of the firing unit for each phase of a STM test event. 
A partial functional decomposition of the STM was next conducted. This involved 
breaking down the initial listing of required functions and providing detailed definitions 
 xviii 
of each desired primary, secondary, or tertiary functionality. Following the 
decomposition, novel functions included in the conceptual round were examined in detail 
to begin the process of allocating form to function. Additionally, a discussion on canister 
selection alternatives was briefly detailed to illustrate the possible choices. The results of 
the decomposition show that the functionality required for the concept has largely already 
been developed, and that the work required to integrate the remaining functions is limited 
in scope. 
The functional decomposition and CONOPS were then used as a baseline for the 
identification of Critical Operational Issues (COIs). These issues were determined to be 
Survivability, Safety, Interoperability, Maintainability, and Effectiveness. Each was 
examined in detail to determine ways both to define and measure the desired parameters 
of the concept. Each was broken down further into measures of effectiveness (MOE) and 
measures of performance (MOP). MOEs are criteria for measuring overall system 
effectiveness, while MOPs are used to evaluate more specific criteria relating to the 
performance of systems or subsystems. These serve to inform future design decisions and 
preliminary test and evaluation planning. 
Drawing from both the COIs identified and the functional decomposition, high-
level system requirements were derived. These system level requirements, along with the 
MOEs and MOPs help to define the trade space utilized during detailed design and 
component selection. Requirements requiring specific values were assigned, instead, 
placeholder values. This allows future work to be conducted within the framework of the 
requirements that were generated without being biased or otherwise constrained by 
hypothetical values.  Qualitative requirements were also generated based upon the novel 
functions previously identified. 
The cost of the Surrogate Test Missile concept was next estimated via analogy 
using the development of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile as the analogous system. By 
assuming that a similar consortium would be leveraged to offset R&D and acquisition 
costs, and making further assumptions regarding the cost of canisters and overhaul, it was 
demonstrated that the Program Acquisition Unit Cost of the STM would be a fraction of 
that of the ESSM, anywhere from roughly one-third to one-eighth the cost. The precise 
 xix 
fraction would depend primarily on the learning curve experienced for the production 
units and the total quantity acquired.  
The feasibility of the preliminary STM concept, and the cost estimates pointing 
toward the realization of considerable cost savings result in the emphatic 
recommendation that this concept continue forward toward development. This study 
provides an analytic framework from which detailed design, analysis of alternatives, and 
developmental test and evaluation can be conducted. Further study should focus on the 
aforementioned design, as well as on a more detailed analogy or parametric cost 
estimation.  
 xx 
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A. FUTURE READINESS ISSUES 
The backbones of the surface combatant fleet today and into the foreseeable 
future are its Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers. In recent years, the readiness of 
these systems has undergone a very public decline, as evidenced by increases in the 
number of Casualty Reports and stark increases in INSURV failures. VADM (Retired) 
Balisle’s panel distills these facts in the Surface Force Readiness report of 2010, which 
noted a culture in which operating degraded gear is considered acceptable.1 Since then, 
efforts have been made to counter these trends, including increasing manning levels and 
improving the “fit” of personnel, and increasing the frequency of live-fire test events, 
which had been curtailed in the mid-2000s in favor of more simulated (synthetic) 
training. This resulted in the Aegis wholeness project, and after four years of effort, the 
Navy has declared that materiel issues are no longer a concern for Aegis units.2 This is 
promising news, but the fact remains that the defense budget remains uncertain, and 
increasing fiscal pressures may again impact maintenance and readiness in the coming 
years. 
This potential is made more serious by the planned obsolescence of the SM-2 
family of surface-to-air missiles, currently scheduled for the mid-2030s timeframe3. The 
replacement area defense missile, the SM-6, has a current average per-unit cost of 
$4.4 million (in FY14 dollars), making this missile round simply too costly for use in 
testing of the combat systems suite or for training, even as this cost is reduced through 
increased volume purchases later in its life cycle.4 The RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow 
Round has simultaneously increased in price per round, with 2014 acquisition figures 
                                                 
1 Phillip Balisle, Fleet Review Panel of Surface Force Readiness (Annapolis, MD: Galrahn, 2010), 43, 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/43245136/Balisle-Report-on-FRP-of-Surface-Force-Readiness. 
2 Sam Lagrone, “The Next Act for Aegis.” USNI News, May 7, 2014. 
http://news.usni.org/2014/05/07/next-act-aegis 
3 Sidney Hodgson, e-mail message to author, November 25, 2013. 
4 Department of Defense (DOD), Selected Acquisition Report: Standard Missile-6. (Arlington, VA: 
Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval, May 21, 2013), 20. (FY04 $ converted to FY14 
using 2014 JIC calculator 1507 cost element.) 
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approaching $1 million dollars (FY 2014) per round.5 These increases in price will likely 
have the effect of reducing the frequency of fleet live-fire events, which could, in turn, 
increase the risk associated with all future test firings as well as combat firings.  
Simultaneous with increasing readiness concerns, additional missions and threats 
have emerged. The continued proliferation of supersonic sea-skimming cruise missiles 
such as the Novatar Klub series, the introduction of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles, and the 
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) mission all serve to raise the stakes for deployed naval 
forces. These new threats represent a direct challenge to the area defense capabilities of 
Aegis, and as a result, a combat systems failure no longer imperils only the lives of those 
onboard the firing unit. Increased proficiency, an emphasis on more immersive training, 
and novel ways of assessing readiness are all required to meet the challenges posed by 
these current and future threats. 
B. INITIAL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
1. Comparison of Available Alternatives 
To achieve the goal of increasing the readiness of the combat systems suites of 
fleet units, there are a number of viable options. The first, which has been pursued over 
the past decade, is the use of synthetic firing events to verify proper operation. While this 
provides the lowest cost of all methods, it is inherently limited in that the firing train is 
not fully utilized. Further, measurements of RF are conducted at dummy loads, which 
may or may not correlate to what would actually be leaving the antenna feedhorn and 
arriving at the missile or target. For these reasons, while synthetic firing events provide 
excellent value, they are at best incomplete, and at worst misleading. 
The second option would be to conduct fleet proficiency firing events utilizing the 
SM-2 inventory. As these rounds age, their military utility decreases, and thus disposal 
through a firing event is preferred. The disadvantage to this approach is that the 
inventory, while large, represents the sum total of the Navy’s area air defense arsenal 
until SM-6 production has built up a large enough inventory. SM-2 production ceased in 
                                                 
5 U.S. Department of the Navy, FY 2014 President’s Budget; Justification Book Volume 1; Weapons 
Procurement, Navy. (Washington, DC: DON, April 2013), 142. 
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2011, and no further rounds will be procured as production shifts to the SM-3 and SM-6 
variants of the missile.6 Furthermore, the firing of a SM-2 requires clearing a very large 
firing range—over 80 nautical miles downrange and 15 degrees to either side of the firing 
bearing. This necessitates the use of non-organic (not carried on the ship itself) patrol 
aircraft for range clearance duties, and makes conducting these firing events difficult in 
many oceanic areas due to surface and air traffic. 
A third option would be to utilize the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) in 
place of the SM for fleet proficiency firing. These missiles are relatively cheap compared 
to the SM-6, with a per-round cost of just less than $1 million, and warhead-compatible 
telemeter (WCT) devices adding approximately $74,000.7 Furthermore, the limited range 
of the ESSM compared to the SM poses less of a constraint to firing location and required 
range clearance assets. 
A fourth option, the one to be investigated in this thesis, is to develop and field a 
recoverable surrogate test missile. This missile would simulate the functionality of 
potentially multiple missile types, communicating with the firing unit’s combat systems 
suite accordingly. Enhanced data recording and retrieval would streamline post-firing 
data collection and analysis. It would share the ESSM’s limited range, and possess better 
inherent safety due to its lack of warhead. Following each firing event, the airframe and 
electronics, along with its canister if fired from the VLS, would be reused after overhaul. 
The cost of a firing event would thus be reduced to the cost of a new solid rocket motor, 
overhaul of the missile and canister, and transportation. 
Another related option would be to develop and field a non-recoverable surrogate 
test missile. Following a firing event, there would be no need to recover the airframe or 
electronics. Cost savings would result from not needing to recover the airframe after each 
mission, transport it to a suitable facility for overhaul, and from the reduced ruggedness 
required for a single-launch platform.  
                                                 
6 Ibid., 74. 
7 Ibid., 142. 
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C. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
1. Selected Process Model 
Given the range of available models and the scope of this report, the “waterfall” 
process model was selected, and tailored to provide the best fit to the anticipated scope of 
this report. This model, first introduced in 1970, usually contains between five and eight 
steps or phases. These are typically sequential, sometimes with a continuous feedback loop 
informing each step8. This basic model was taken, and tailored specifically to the goals of 
this thesis. It will be used as a guide throughout the research and writing, and informs the 
approach taken in developing and fleshing out the subject concept. Its sequential steps thus 
become chapters or sub-chapters of the thesis report, and each feeds into the next. The 
layout of the tailored process model in Figure 1 is intentionally a rough approximation of 
the layout of this thesis.  
 
Figure 1.  Tailored Process Model.  
                                                 
8 Benjamin Blanchard and Wolter Fabrycky. Systems Engineering and Analysis 5th edition. (Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2011), 36. 
 5 
The tailored process model, depicted in Figure 1, is fed by the needs of the fleet, 
depicted in red. The black arrows depict sequential process steps, while the green arrows 
depict the iterative feedback received through further research and stakeholder 
interaction. The feedback is not necessarily iterative, but rather flows back up the process 
to any previous step. The desired outputs of this project are recommendations and topics 
identified for further study, with a potential future solution identified to meet the needs of 
the fleet. 
This model serves as a roadmap to be used to guide the analysis and research into 
the chosen concept. As this concept is further developed throughout the report, each step 
will be addressed sequentially, with feedback being applied to earlier work or explored 
further via stakeholder interactions.  While each step is not necessarily its own chapter, 
the thesis was laid out in such a way that it would follow along with the process model 
coherently.  
2. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Process 
Integration 
The majority of the topics addressed by this thesis fall under the Capabilities 
Based Assessment (CBA) portion of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS). This assessment is conducted “to assess capability requirements and 
associated capability gaps and risks.9.  In this case, the identified capability gap is the 
lack of a cost-effective means to provide live-fire training and readiness assessment to 
AEGIS-equipped ships. The assessment is based, in part, on high-level strategy and 
guidance such as that provided in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)10. The 2010 
QDR states that “as we apply resources, we will prioritize readiness and capability over 
capacity” and “the United States seeks to develop additional opportunities for joint and 
combined training in the Western Pacific that respond to the need for constant readiness  
 
                                                 
9 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSINST 3170.01H; Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System. (10 January 2012), Enclosure A, A-1 
10 Ibid., A-2 
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of U.S. forces to carry out joint operations.”11 This concept fulfills the identified needs of 
prioritized readiness and provides additional opportunities for training in support of that 
readiness. 
Specifically, this thesis addresses a specific idea for a material approach. The 
newest versions of the CJCSI instruction no longer break down the CBA into its 
component parts, but referring to previous versions (specifically CJCSI 3170.01F) helps 
place this thesis into a specific context. As shown in Figure 2, the process leading to an 
Initial Capabilities Document requires both a functional needs analysis as well as a 
functional solution analysis of specific ideas for a material approach to the identified 
need/needs. For the purpose of this thesis, Section B of the 3170.01F, describing different 
ideas for material and non-material approaches to the need of maintaining and enhancing 
readiness would be an example of a functional needs analysis12. The bulk of this thesis 
will be spent examining the selected material approach alternative in depth and is an 
example of a functional solution analysis. 
 
                                                 
11 Department of Defense, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. (Washington, DC: DOD, 
February, 2010), 66, 104 
12 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCSINST 3170.01F, Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System, (May 1, 2007), Enclosure B, B-1 - B-4 
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Figure 2.  Focus of the Capabilities Based Assessment Process within JCIDS.13 
  
                                                 
13 “JCIDS Process; Functional Solutions Analysis,” AcqNotes, accessed February 12, 2014,  
http://www.acqnotes.com/Acquisitions/Functional%20Solutions%20Analysis%20.html 
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II. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS, PROBLEM STATEMENT 
AND SCOPE 
A. STAKEHOLDER IDENTIFICATION 
1. Project Stakeholders 
The primary stakeholder is the project sponsor, PEO IWS 1 (Aegis Fleet 
Readiness). Other stakeholders include, in no particular order: Aegis Training and 
Readiness Center; Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren, Corona, and Port Hueneme); 
Surface Combat Systems Center Wallops Island; Naval Surface Forces; Commander, 
Operational Test and Evaluation Force; PEO IWS 3 (Standard Missile and Evolved Sea 
Sparrow Missile); PEO IWS 4 (FMS); OPNAV N86 (Surface Warfare); OPNAV N865 
(BMD Afloat); Combatant and Fleet Commanders; and fleet users. Additionally, a 
number of civilian contractors have been identified who would likely be stakeholders 
should this project be pursued beyond the academic level. These include, but are by no 
means limited to: ATK Aerospace Group, producers of navalized solid-rocket motors; 
BAE Systems, Land & Armaments Division, produces and refurbishes VLS canisters; 
and Raytheon Missile Systems, producers of airframes and guidance components. 
A geographic representation of stakeholder distribution is provided in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3.  Naval Enterprise Stakeholders for Surrogate Test Missile Concept.14 
B. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Limited sponsor engagement was conducted prior to commencement of thesis 
work. This included an informal meeting with CAPT Thomas Druggan, head of PEO 
IWS 1, immediately following an on-campus briefing. Fredrick Rischmiller, Aegis In-
Service principal/assistant project manager for PEO IWS 1, was engaged shortly 
thereafter, and arrangements were made for travel to Washington, DC, to meet with 
individuals in the sponsor’s organization, PEO IWS 1. Based on interactions with the 
sponsor, a tentative list of primitive needs was established. This list was further refined 
through site visits to PEO IWS 3 and interaction with several key defense contractors. 
User needs were developed through conversations with stakeholders and the author’s 
Aegis experience, which includes eight years as an Aegis FCS/ORTS technician and two 
years as an Aegis fire control officer.  
As the concept was developed further, additional stakeholder interaction was 
conducted to help refine the analysis. Meetings with key personnel at Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces in San Diego were held to refine the scenarios and functional definitions 
                                                 
14 “Large Map,” United-States-Map.com, accessed June 13, 2014, http://www.united-states-
map.com/tabloid.htm.  
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as they were being developed. Focused discussions were conducted with engineers at the 
Naval Surface Warfare Center in Port Hueneme to assist in refining the problem 
statement and to identify problems with the overall concept of operations. These informal 
meetings and discussions helped to steer the progress of the thesis and provided valuable 
insight into potential issues the STM could face. 
1. Stakeholder Identification and Needs 
To determine system needs, stakeholders were arranged by type, and their various 
primitive needs analyzed to determine effective needs to be addressed. Table 1 presents 
an initial analysis of stakeholder needs, as determined through various forms of 
interaction. The primitive needs represent desired outcomes, with no means specified. 
From these, effective needs were developed. The effective needs address the underlying 
problems of the primitive needs but have been refined in such a way that means are more 
readily identified to address them. As indicated in Table 1, the primitive needs of the 
sponsor and the users can be refined into fairly similar effective needs.  
 
Table 1.   Stakeholder Identification and Needs 
This initial analysis of primitive and effective needs was utilized to develop an 
initial concept of operations and to further refine the draft problem statement. 
Additionally, the effective needs were further refined into system needs, which will later 
be utilized in determining desired functionality and requirements. As illustrated in Table 
STAKEHOLDER TYPE EXAMPLE ENTITIES PRIMITIVE NEEDS EFFECTIVE NEEDS
SPONSOR PEO IWS, OPNAV
To maintain readiness in prolonged fiscally 
constrained environment.  To train, equip, and 
maintain ships such that they are capable of 
combat operations.
To develop a very low cost, effective means of 
testing the readiness of installed combat 
systems equipment.  To develop a means to 
conduct high-fidelity training events.
COCOMs, Numbered fleet 
commanders, Commodores
To supervise the readiness of ships assigned.  To 
ensure maintenance and logistics requirements 
are being met for assigned ships.
To have a means available to rapidly verify the 
readiness of an individual ship's combat 
systems suite.
Ship COs, Sailors, Technical 
Representatives
Confidence and competence in the operation of 
installed Combat Systems.
To be capable of rapidly, accurately, and safely 
determining the status of installed combat 
systems
PRODUCERS
Raytheon Missile Systems, ATK, 
BAE, Lockheed Martin, Others
To provide customers with safe and reliable 
products that fulfill one or more needs.  
To maintain technological advantage over 
competitors.  To procure sufficient profit 
margin to fund continued R&D.
USERS
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2, the system needs were decomposed into means of implementation, which will guide 
the initial functional decomposition and requirements generation for the conceptual 
system. 
 
Table 2.   Stakeholder Derived System Needs and Implementation 
The needs of each stakeholder type contribute slightly different functional system 
needs. These needs are further explored in the following paragraphs. 
a. Sponsor Needs 
As the primary sponsor, PEO IWS seeks to achieve higher readiness for the 
AEGIS fleet without incurring the same level of cost and depletion of the existing 
inventory entailed by continued fleet proficiency firings using the Standard Missile (SM). 
To that end, a system designed to meet these needs would have to offer sufficient fidelity 
and readiness benefits at a lower cost than the SM. To meet that need, a number of 
options are available. Existing components can be utilized, reducing the extent and thus 
cost of research and development. Specific components that should be examined for 
integration include the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) and VLS canister. There already exist 
SRM designs that could be adapted for use with the STM. Examples include the SRMs 
STAKEHOLDER SYSTEM NEEDS (FUNCTIONS & REQUIREMENTS) IMPLEMENTATION OF SYSTEM NEEDS
SPONSOR
Develop a low cost round that approximates the 
performance and systems interfaces of Surface-to-
Air missile systems currently in use.
Feasibil ity of reusability examined.  Util ize 
existing components such as canister and solid 
rocket motor.  Leverage the ubiquity of low-cost 
processing power and open architecture to lower 
cost for guidance and control subsystems.  
Pursue joint application and FMS to increase 
acquisition quantity to further drive down costs.
USERS
Firing rage flexibil ity.  No requirement for non-
organic range clearance platforms prior to firing 
event.  Rapid data extraction after firing events.  
Ability to share firing test results with remote 
support activities.  Ability to recover the expended 
round rapidly and safely with organic capabilities. 
(Helo or RHIB)
Maximum range limited through size of 
propellant charge in SRM.  Onboard data 
recording subsystem outputs formatted data 
immediately following test event.  Airframe 
designed with the safety and efficacy of 
recoverability emphasized.
PRODUCERS
Meets needs of widest possible user base.  Design 
focused on produceability and ease of 
overhaul/refurbishment.
Flexible design that incorporates the ability to 
reconfigure onboard electronics package to 
simulate a wide variety of commonly used joint 
and foreign missile systems.
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used for the ESSM and the NSSM. These rocket motors are already certified for use 
within VLS, further reducing test and evaluation costs.  
Another avenue to pursue to lower cost is the early involvement of joint and allied 
forces in research and development. The United States Navy is not the only allied force 
entering a period of relative austerity, and if this concept can lower the cost of conducting 
live-fire testing, it is highly likely there would be considerable interest in foreign military 
sales (FMS). Likewise, if the concept is capable of being adapted to other combat 
systems, joint missile systems such as Patriot could derive benefit. Early involvement by 
these parties would serve to share research and development costs as well as increasing 
the overall acquisition numbers. Increased total acquisition would serve to further reduce 
per-unit cost, and will be discussed further in Chapter VI. 
b. User Needs 
User needs are considerably more specific than sponsor needs. One of the 
foremost considerations is, of course, the safety of usage for such a round. The round 
must be safe in every phase of its usage. The rocket motor must be capable of being made 
safe for handling operations. The canister must be Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation 
to Ordinance (HERO) safe, rugged, and compatible with existing launcher safety 
mechanisms. In flight, the round must not deviate from controlled flight, and a means to 
conduct an emergency flight termination on command is a requirement. Post-flight, the 
recovery methods must be safe and expeditious, and the round must have a means to be 
stabilized for transport to an overhaul facility. 
Another key user need is greater flexibility in firing ranges. Reducing the 
maximum range of the round to within the visual line-of-sight of the ship removes the 
requirement for non-organic range clearance assets by effectively reducing the size of the 
range to the firing unit’s visible horizon. Additionally, the time required to clear the firing 
range would be significantly lessened, allowing time for additional training requirements 
or for carrying out other duties assigned.  The relaxed range requirements would also be 
of utility in the case of emergent combat systems casualties while deployed. 
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A final need is the requirement to be able to rapidly identify and localize faults 
within the firing unit’s combat systems suite. This calls for a hardware and software 
design that enables the easy transfer of formatted data from a firing event to both 
technicians on the firing unit as well as remote technical support organizations.  
c. Producer Needs 
Producer needs are focused on the economic aspects of the production of the 
STM. To meet the needs of the producers, sufficient numbers of the STM must be 
acquisitioned to make production economically viable and minimize costs. 
Considerations for the sponsor and user needs must not negatively impact the 
producibility of the round to an extent that profit is impacted.  
Implementing this will require that the round be sufficiently flexible from a 
hardware standpoint that as many potential users are available as possible. For instance, if 
with minor modifications the round could be made to be compatible with the Patriot 
Missile System, an entirely new customer base is established with a minimum of cost 
required for retooling or software changes. Similarly, if FMS are authorized earlier versus 
later, additional contracts can be made for the sale and servicing of rounds, increasing the 
production quantity and lowering costs for all customers through learning curve and 
production rate effects. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Based upon stakeholder analysis, the following problem statement was developed: 
Live-fire missile exercises are essential to verify system readiness and increase crew 
proficiency, but rising costs and declining inventory threaten the long-term feasibility of 
doing so. The project objective is thus: Confronted with a constrained fiscal situation, 
develop a means of conducting fleet proficiency firing events more frequently and at 
reduced cost. The specific means to be investigated in this thesis is a system-of-systems 
composed, in part, of a surrogate test missile designed to be recoverable and reusable. 
This missile will be compatible with all current baselines of the AEGIS weapons system, 
with allowance for future upgradability to support Air and Missile Defense Radar 
(AMDR) and Zumwalt configurations, among others. 
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The STM system of systems has the potential to increase readiness and reduce the 
risks associated with test and combat firing events. The increased readiness could be 
realized in two ways: 1) through increased watchstander experience and competence, and 
thus confidence, and 2) through the exhaustive pre- and post-fire maintenance checks 
conducted for a live fire exercise. The reduction in risk is a function of detection of fault 
conditions prior to either test firings (utilizing actual missiles) or deployment to a combat 
zone.  
D. SCOPE 
1. Scope and Context of Thesis 
This thesis will examine the feasibility of the construction and utilization of a 
system of systems composed of a surrogate test missile and its associated recovery and 
support equipment. Cost estimation will be conducted in support of a tentative cost-
benefit analysis. The required functionality for such a system will be decomposed, and 
form will be matched to function. Alternatives will be analyzed to the extent that they 
currently exist. Test and evaluation consideration for such a system will be briefly 
covered as well. 
Additionally, discussion of various extended capabilities that could be considered 
for inclusion will be included. This includes, but is not limited to, the potential for FMS 
and pursuing joint involvement. Life cycle considerations for such a system of systems 
will be covered in depth. 
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Figure 4.  High Level Surrogate Test Missile System Context Diagram 
Figure 4 illustrates the context and boundaries of the Surrogate Test Missile 
System (STMS). Each boundary interaction, indicated by the blue arrows, is provided 
with system-level considerations that must be addressed for the STMS to function safely, 
reliably, and effectively. This initial context diagram allows operational considerations 
for the employment of the STMS to be envisioned, and helps to further refine the scope 
of this thesis. 
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Figure 5.  Detailed context diagram for the Surrogate Test Missile. 
Figure 5 builds on the higher-level context diagram in Figure 4, and details the 
critical interface considerations for the STM itself from a System-of-systems perspective. 
The arrows again represent boundaries over which information, physical matter, or 
energy is exchanged. In developing this context diagram, potential problems are 
highlighted, especially when considering interfaces. For instance, when evaluating how 
the missile will be made compatible with various launching systems, the canister used in 
that launching system must be considered, along with the various interfaces between the 
missile and the canister and between the canister and the launching system.  
2. Out of Scope 
This thesis delves only superficially into an examination of available alternatives, 
as its primary purpose is the investigation of the feasibility and cost/benefit of one 
specific alternative. Detailed analysis of alternatives, as conducted during the JCIDS 
process, is deferred for further study. Similarly, cost estimation is conducted via the 
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analogy method only, utilizing recent missile acquisition program data. A more detailed 
parametric or engineering approach is also deferred for potential follow-on studies. 
This thesis concentrates primarily on development of the STM for use with the 
AEGIS weapons system, and investigates potential modifications for other combat 
systems or joint usage only superficially. Functional decomposition is primarily focused 
on the specific variant to be used with AWS, although adapting these functions to another 
weapons system should be considerably simplified by the identification of core 
functionalities required for effective operation. 
Other items of discussion outside the scope of this thesis include prototyping, 
contracting, and reliability and availability analysis. Additionally, in the interest of 
minimizing the level of classification of this thesis, specific capabilities and limitations of 
the AEGIS weapon system, and other weapons and weapons systems, are either 
generalized or not discussed.  
3. Limitations 
The primary limitations of this thesis are the allotted timeframe, resource access, 
and expertise level of the author. The author of this thesis is not an aerospace engineer 
and has no experience outside of the academic setting with weapon systems acquisition. 
This thesis is strictly based on a systems engineering approach to an identified problem. 
All discussions of functionality, concepts of operations, requirements, and life cycle 
considerations will benefit greatly from an independent review and validation by experts 
in the specific fields involved. Whenever possible, the author attempted to reach out to 
stakeholders with the required expertise to fill in knowledge gaps, but given the 
conceptual nature of the system being examined, it is likely that more feasibility studies 
are required if it is desired to bring this system to fruition. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The preceding analysis identified the key stakeholder needs, defined the problem 
the remainder of this thesis addresses, and outlined the scope and limitations of this 
thesis. The specific problem to be addressed is simply to develop a low-cost, safe and 
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effective means of conducting fleet proficiency firings. Any proposed solution must be 
cost effective, operate safely, and, most importantly, be effective in assessing and thus 
improving the readiness of a given combat system in order to address the key needs of the 
stakeholders. Having established the scope and boundaries of the problem space, defined 
the problem, and established the effective needs for the system, the next step is to begin 
identifying required system functionality through the development of scenarios and an 
overall operational concept. 
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III. INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
A. EXPLORATION OF CONCEPTS 
Developing a basic initial concept of operations, usage scenarios, and vignettes is 
helpful in determining the required functionality of a system or systems. Taking the 
problem statement, context diagram, and stakeholder input and analyzing them, the 
concept is next explored from a usage standpoint to identify what it must do in order to 
meet the identified needs of the various stakeholders.   
1. Example Concept of Operations 
The STM is envisioned as a “wooden” round, requiring no periodic maintenance 
for long time periods (i.e., more than five years) once it is placed in its canister. Ships 
typically will not deploy with the STM, but rather, the round will be loaded specifically 
to conduct a test or training firing event. Following the firing event, the empty canister 
will be removed and replaced with the desired missile type. Between firing events, STMs 
will be held in reserve at Naval Weapons Stations, with further rounds available at select 
overseas locations to facilitate emergent testing and/or proficiency requirements for 
deployed units. Potential locations for storage of STMs for use by naval forces around the 




Figure 6.  Potential CONUS and forward staging bases for Surrogate Test Missiles.  
Once loaded, the STM will be checked out by shipboard VLS personnel to verify 
its functionality. Assuming all built-in test (BIT) functions check out properly, the round 
will be cleared to be fired. Should any BIT failures be noted, the round will be 
immediately off-loaded and flagged for maintenance. Once the round has been cleared 
for firing, the ship’s Missile Systems Supervisor or equivalent watchstander will build a 
manual firing sequence, selecting the STM as the first missile in the firing sequence.  
The ship loaded with the STM will proceed to a designated firing range. Due to 
the decreased maximum range and altitude the STM is capable of relative to the SM, the 
ship will be capable of conducting range clearance using only installed sensors - without 
the need for non-organic clearance support assets. If target drone assets are available, the 
launch of one will be coordinated. If no BQM (target drone) assets are available, the 
missile will be capable of flying a preset flight profile against an AN/SPY-1 test target 
(or equivalent synthetic target) while still being capable of verifying the functionality of 
uplink/downlink and terminal guidance. 
If a BQM is available, it will be set to fly an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) 
profile and will be launched once the range is declared clear. Once the target is detected 
and tracking commences, a final check of range clearance will be conducted. If clear, the 
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Commanding Officer of the firing ship will declare “Batteries Release” for STM firing. 
The target will be engaged, and the STM launched, such that its point of intercept is 
approximately 10nm distant from the firing unit. During the boost phase, the STM will 
establish uplink with the firing unit’s combat system and begin recording all received 
commands as well as transmitted status updates. Additionally, all flight dynamics will be 
recorded, to include acceleration and positioning of flight control surfaces. 
During the midcourse phase, the STM will continuously monitor midcourse 
guidance updates, recording time of receipt, content of command, signal amplitude, and 
range from firing unit. As the STM descends toward the point of intercept, an altimeter 
will monitor and record the distance to the surface. A programmable minimum altitude 
may be activated prior to launch to increase safety. As the STM enter the terminal phase, 
it receives, measures, and records the amplitude of received continuous-wave 
illumination (CWI) from both the rear reference beam and the main beam reflection from 
the target. Because the purpose of the STM is to verify the functionality of the firing 
unit’s combat systems, the engagement does not need to be consummated to the same 
level of accuracy as when simultaneously testing the efficacy of the weapon, such as 
when firing a warhead compatible telemeter (WCT) -equipped SM-2. For that reason, 
outside of obtaining accurate readings of the amplitude of the reflected main beam CWI, 
there is no need for the missile to approach closer than a few hundred feet from the target.  
Upon reaching the closest point of approach with the target drone, the STM will 
immediately pitch upward and climb to bleed off, or aerodynamically reduce, airspeed. A 
drogue and parachute will slow the airframe as it descends. Once in the water, a 
transponder will activate and a sea dye marker will deploy to assist recovery personnel. 
Recovery will be possible using either a helicopter or a rigid-hull inflatable boat. In either 
case, a search and rescue (SAR) swimmer will deploy into the water and attach a 
recovery sling to the STM airframe. This will allow the round to either be lifted vertically 
or towed astern of the RHIB for the return to the ship. If the recovery is done via 
helicopter, the STM will be lowered into a recovery cradle for transport back to shore. On 
the other hand, if it is towed via the RHIB, it will need to be lifted out of the water from 
alongside the ship and placed into its cradle. When the STM is recovered, shipboard 
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personnel will be able to access its onboard data storage. After recovery and initial 
inspections are conducted, the STM will be thoroughly cleaned and rinsed with fresh 
water to limit corrosion effects caused by immersion in sea water. 
Once the ship returns to port, the STM in its cradle assembly will be removed via 
crane onto the pier. The airframe will again be inspected to ensure it is safe for 
transportation. The assembly will be shipped to the nearest designated overhaul facility. 
On arrival, the STM will be thoroughly inspected for damage, wear, and metal fatigue. 
The onboard electronics packages will be tested, and all electronics enclosures inspected 
for water intrusion. If all inspections are satisfactory, the STM will have its solid rocket 
motor replaced, along with other required replacement items such as batteries and data 
storage media. Following a final check-out, the STM will be replaced into a refurbished 
canister and transferred to storage to await the next launch event. 
The expended canister will be offloaded in port and replaced as required with a 
loaded canister. The expended canister will be inspected and then shipped to a designated 
overhaul facility for refurbishment. One area that bears further study is the feasibility and 
cost effectiveness of conducting a limited cleaning of the expended canister prior to 
capping the ends and shipping it for overhaul. BAE Land & Armaments Systems 
representatives report at times extensive corrosion caused by prolonged periods of 
exposure to missile exhaust residue in the Mk 13 canisters returned by the Navy. This 
corrosion often requires the installation of doubler plates, or welded reinforcements for 
the canister structure, which adds cost to refurbishment while simultaneously reducing 
the lifespan of the canister.15 Alternatively, a more resilient ablative-type coating could 
be applied to the canister interior to limit the corrosive effects of the missile exhaust 
residue. 
2. Training CONOPs 
In addition to the actual rounds, procurement of several “wooden” STM rounds 
should be considered. These rounds, lacking actual electronics and rocket motors, would 
                                                 
15 Thomas Callies, Launching Systems Program Manager at BAE Systems, conversation with author, 
January 15, 2014. 
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instead be used for training personnel who handle the rounds, either in the factory 
overhaul and inspection environment, or for training SAR swimmers to be proficient in 
handling the round in the water. For example, one or two wooden rounds could be 
maintained in the overhaul facility, and used to familiarize new maintenance personnel in 
the procedures used to inspect and refurbish the rounds. A canister could be used in 
conjunction with these rounds for training in mating procedures. Additional wooden 
rounds could be kept in fleet concentration areas and used for the training of SAR 
personnel. These rounds would be deployed, either in a pool or in open water, and used to 
gauge the proficiency of SAR swimmers as part of the SAR certification process. An 
additional round should be provided to the SAR schoolhouse for use in initial training of 
STM handling procedures. 
B. SCENARIOS 
The following scenarios were developed to illustrate potential avenues of fleet 
usage as well as to assist in the determination of any overlooked effective needs and 
requirements. 
1. Sixth Fleet BMD Casualty 
USS Ross is conducting a routine patrol in the Eastern Mediterranean in support 
of BMD operations when her C&D cooling skid fails. Due to a broken wire in the skid 
alarm panel, the alarm is not transmitted to Combat Systems Maintenance Central, and 
the first indication technicians receive of a problem is when AN/SPY-1 drops offline with 
a signal processor (SIGPRO) fault. Simultaneously, the SIGPRO over-temperature alarm 
sounds. Technicians respond and immediately secure power to the SIGPRO. Inspection 
reveals severe damage and melted solder in the backplane wiring of the SIGPRO. The 
casualty is determined to be beyond ship’s force repair capability, and Ross is ordered to 
Souda Bay, Crete, for technical assistance. AN/SPY-1 technical representative are flown 
in from Italy and begin what becomes nearly 10 days of repairs.  
As repairs are drawing to a close, 6th Fleet expresses concern as to whether or not 
Ross is fully mission capable and orders a STM to be fired to fully validate the AN/SPY-
1 repairs. One of the two STMs stored at Souda Bay is delivered to the pier and lowered 
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into Ross’ VLS as repairs are ongoing. Upon completion of repairs, Ross stands to sea 
and proceeds to the NATO missile firing range just north of Crete. Arriving on station 
two hours late, following communications checks and a final check of system status, a 
shore-launched BQM-74 is intercepted successfully by the STM. Ross closes and 
recovers both the missile and drone. Ship’s force technicians remove the data storage 
from the STM and within an hour of launch have all the data needed to declare the AWS 
onboard Ross as fully operational. Missile firing data is emailed to 6th Fleet along with a 
casualty correction message. After a brief stop in Souda Bay to offload the expended 
canister and load a SM-6, Ross stands out to sea and proceeds back to her station. 
a. Scenario Challenges 
Loading a test round into a VLS magazine loaded with live ordinance could be 
considered to violate one of the cardinal safety rules for VLS – that no simulator round 
shall be loaded in a launcher containing live ordinance.16 It is unclear, however, if this 
rule, designed to prevent the inadvertent launch of live missiles when conducting training 
or testing, fully applies in this case. For one, the test missile would be selected in a 
manual firing sequence, just as current WCT-equipped missiles are. This selection will be 
verified by multiple watchstanders. Next, by only enabling the Canister Safe Enable 
Switch (CSES) on the test missile canister, only that singular missile will be capable of 
receiving the Launch Enable signaling to fire. Though some probability that the wrong 
missile will be selected and fired exists, this is a very remote probability. That probability 
can further be reduced by including clear labeling on the canister near the CSES switch 
that identifies the missile as a test round. Another way to minimize risk is to use a code 
plug that identifies the missile as a test round to the system, although to use a unique code 
plug would require software updates for VLS or WCS, or both. 
                                                 
16 Leo Schnieder, “VLS: A Challenge Met, An Old Rule Kept.” (24th Annual Technical Symposium, 
April 1987), accession Number: ADA183944. 
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA183944, 12 
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2. CSSQT Certification 
The USS Comte De Grasse, DDG 125, is weeks away from commissioning. As a 
new Baseline Flight III DDG, her AEGIS Weapon system has significant architecture and 
software changes. Due to this, she is scheduled to fire three Standard Missiles and two 
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles during her CSSQT firings. To ensure her system is 
prepared, she is also loaded with two STMs. One week prior to the SM firing events, she 
is ordered to sea to conduct a live firing event with the STMs.  
Once at sea, a range clearance is conducted. Once the range has been declared 
safe, a BQM-74 is launched from her flight deck and proceeds down-range, then turns 
inbound and assumes an ASCM flight profile. The BQM is detected at the expected 
range, and as the intercept point passes within 10nm of the ship, the first STM is 
launched. Topside safety observers immediately note that the flight of the STM is erratic, 
with the round violently zig-zagging downrange. The SPY Radar System Controller 
observes the STM to miss the intercept point by an estimated two miles. Upon recovery 
and data extraction, technicians note that the midcourse guidance commands from SPY 
were wildly inconsistent. Investigation reveals a faulty signal generator which was 
inserting random phase shifts that went undetected by installed fault detection equipment. 
The part is replaced, and the next STM firing is a complete success. Comte De Grasse is 
cleared to conduct follow-on SM firings. 
a. Scenario Challenges 
Similar to the first scenario, this scenario would require mixing test and live 
missiles. However, because this is a more limited test scenario, the number of missiles 
involved would be such that it would be possible to keep the STMs and the other 
ordinance separated in different launchers. For example, the STMs could be loaded in the 
forward launcher, and the ESSMs and SMs could be loaded in the aft launcher. 
3. Fleet Proficiency Firing 
The USS Donald Cook, as part of its training cycle, is selected to do a live firing 
event for watchstander proficiency. As it is forward deployed to Rota, there is a lack of 
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BQM assets to support the proficiency firing. As a result, this training firing will utilize a 
modified Scan Eagle drone that has been outfitted with radar cross-section augmentation 
to give it the approximate RCS of a typical Low Slow Flyer threat. Donald Cook gets 
underway from Rota and proceeds approximately 70nm into the Gulf of Cadiz. Upon 
clearing the range visually and electronically, the Scan Eagle is launched from the flight 
deck. Its onboard cameras are used to visually clear the range as it proceeds 
approximately 30nm from the ship before turning and heading inbound. 
As the Scan Eagle approaches the ship, it is detected on radar. The observed Low 
Slow Flyer profile, along with intelligence injections that detail the threat, prompts the 
watchteam to step through their required actions. Because the intelligence suggests that 
this threat could potentially be carrying chemical weapons, the decision is made to 
engage the threat as soon as it is visually identified.  The CIC watchteam conducts 
queries and warnings on the inbound target, stepping through the procedures they would 
use if faced with an actual threat. As the target approaches 10nm, the bridge watchteam 
verifies to CIC that the tracked target is the threat platform identified by earlier 
intelligence, and the CO gives the watchteam batteries release. As the threat passes 
through 10nm, the STM is fired at the Scan Eagle. All systems perform to specification, 
and both the Scan Eagle and STM are recovered prior to the Donald Cook returning to 
port. 
a. Scenario Challenges 
Due to the reduced range of the STM relative to the Standard Missile, training 
events would necessarily lose some fidelity when the STM is fired in lieu of the SM. For 
instance, against an ASCM, the SM would be fired almost immediately upon detection of 
the threat, while use of the STM would require that the “recommend fire” alert not be 
acted upon until the intercept point reaches the maximum range of the STM. This is not 
“Training how you fight,” and some concern has been expressed by Commander, Naval 
Surface Forces and others that this could diminish the training quality received by 
proficiency firings. 
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This scenario presents one way to minimize that concern by presenting a non-
traditional training scenario in which a SM would conceivably be used. Additionally, the 
use of the low-cost Scan Eagle as a target is a novel way to get around a lack of ASCM-
type target availability while still providing training against relevant threats such as 
terrorist-controlled LSF aircraft and UAVs such as the Harpy. 
4. Fire Control System Failure Vignette 
During a post-drydock availability firing event, USS Arleigh Burke expends a 
STM against a BQM-177. As the interception enters the terminal phase, Illuminator #2 is 
assigned to the target. However, when the transmitter cycles up to Radiate, it immediately 
drops offline with a travelling wave tube (TWT) fault. WCS then assigns Illuminator #3, 
but it too fails due to a faulty train gyroscope. The target is in the cutout for Illuminator 
#1. The STM, upon detecting no expected passive homing radiation, immediately climbs 
to a safe altitude to prevent inadvertent collision with the target drone. Upon recovery, all 
AN/SPY-1D data is determined to be nominal, and the ship’s combat system is declared 
fully operational once the faulty Mk 99 fire control systems are diagnosed and repaired. 
5. Parachute Failure Vignette 
After a nominal interception against a BQM-74E, the STM pitched up as 
expected, but a solenoid failure caused the parachute to fail to deploy properly. The STM 
tumbled downward over 8000 feet, slowed only by a partially deployed drogue, before 
forcefully impacting the water. The recovery beacon activated as designed and the firing 
unit closed and placed a SAR swimmer in the water to assess the damage. The airframe, 
although warped by impact, was mostly intact, so the recovery harness was attached. An 
SH-60 helicopter lifted the round and placed it on the flight deck, as it was too damaged 
to properly fit in its cradle. Shipboard technicians accessed the data storage compartment 
and were able to download all firing data. The missile was returned to the overhaul 
facility, where useable components were removed prior to the damaged airframe 
components being scrapped. 
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C. DESIGN REFERENCE MISSION 
The design reference mission (DRM) for this concept, derived from the scenarios 
and vignettes, consists of three distinct phases: preflight, firing event, and post-flight. The 
Preflight phase consists of the transportation of the STM to the designated firing unit, 
where the STM is loaded into the launching system and built-in test functions are used to 
determine its status. Following these events, and conditioned on the STM passing all 
testing, the firing unit leaves port and transits to a suitable firing range. Range clearance 
checks are conducted to ensure no surface or air traffic will conflict with the flight of the 
STM or the target drone (if utilized). The firing event phase begins with the launch of the 
target drone and its subsequent detection and identification by the firing unit’s combat 
systems suite. As the target drone proceeds inbound, it is engaged, and the engagement is 
consummated once the predicted intercept point is within 10nm of the firing unit. The 
STM flies out, responding to transmitted commands from the firing unit. Upon intercept, 
the STM decelerates and enters the water. The post-flight phase begins upon water entry, 
with splashdown and the subsequent activation of the recovery beacon. The STM is then 
recovered by either the firing unit or a designated recovery platform. All firing data is 
extracted and uploaded, and the recovered airframe is then transported to shore for further 
transit to an overhaul facility. The canister is removed from the firing unit, thoroughly 
cleaned to prevent corrosion from rocket exhaust residue, and transported to the overhaul 
facility. The post-flight phase ends upon completion of post-firing maintenance on the 
STM and canister with the STM checked out and cleared for another firing event. Due to 
the nature of this conceptual round, there is no need for additional design reference 
missions. The STM is strictly designed to provide confirmation of the operability of 
combat systems suites and their associated firing chain. Testing will not be conducted in 
conjunction with combat operations, in inclement weather, or under any other 
circumstances that would necessitate the development of more robust reference missions.  
D. SUMMARY 
The analysis conducted in this chapter provided an initial concept of operations, 
from which a design reference mission was extrapolated. The various scenarios presented 
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assist in the identification of required functionality. Key challenges that must be 
addressed are the safety of utilizing the STM within VLS and developing effective and 
realistic training scenarios. By exploring how the STM would be used, the critical system 
needs can be extracted and analyzed via a detailed functional decomposition. 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
A. FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
The process of thinking through several usage scenarios and developing a concept 
of operations led directly to the identification of required operational system functions. 
To narrow the scope of this analysis, the majority of the functions here described pertain 
to the Surrogate Test Missile only, with functional requirements for other components of 
the Surrogate Test Missile System addressed only superficially. To fully develop these 
functions, a functional decomposition of the STM was first performed, identifying the 
major functionalities that must be performed to ensure the concept performs properly and 
safely. This chapter decomposes the various required functions and describes the means 
by which selected functions would be accomplished. 
1. Top-level Functional Definitions 
The STM concept, to be successful in its primary goal of verifying the readiness 
of a combat system, must be capable of multiple, specific functions. To explore the 
required functionality, an Aegis-compatible missile was examined. The required 
functions derived specific to Aegis would, of course, have analogs for a STM designed to 
support another combat system. For instance, a STM configured to simulate a NSSM 
may need to be capable of receiving and measuring Mk 95 CWI FCS guidance rather 
than that from an AN/SPG-62. Keeping that in mind, the top-level functional 
decomposition for the STM is depicted in Figure 7: 
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Figure 7.  Top Level Functional Hierarchy of AEGIS-Configured STM 
Manage Interfaces: This function denotes the requirement that the STM provide 
a means, physical or otherwise, for connecting to, receiving data and commands from, 
and reporting status to a number of shipboard Combat System elements. The sub-
functions included are specific to AEGIS, but would have analogs if the STM was 
configured to function with a different combat system. In this particular case, the (1.1) 
subfunction, Interface with VLS, describes the requirement to physically and 
electronically interface with the Vertical Launch System, to include the Launch 
Sequencer (LSEQ) and Launch Control Unit (LCU). Further physical interfaces are 
implied, including but not limited to gas management, deluge, and umbilical. Further, the 
interface would require a code plug that correctly identifies the missile to the VLS 
computer system. The (1.2) subfunction, Interface with AN/SPY-1, describes the 
requirement for compatibility with AN/SPY-1 missile uplink and downlink 
transmissions. The (1.3) subfunction, Interface with AN/SPG-62, describes the 
requirement for a capability to receive AN/SPG-62 terminal homing CWI radiation, to 
include rear-reference reception. The (1.4) Interface with Data Extraction subfunction 
describes the requirement to be capable of transferring collected data to a designated 
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subsystem. This could be as simple as transferring a memory card into a laptop computer, 
or wirelessly transmitting recorded data back to terminal. Finally, the (1.5) subfunction, 
Interface with Recovery Systems, describes the physical interface requirements for the 
STM’s recovery subsystems, specifically the lifting sling and transport cradle. 
Control Flight: This function describes the requirement for the STM to maintain 
controlled flight. The (2.1) subfunction, Produce Thrust, describes the requirement for a 
source of both boost and sustainment thrust to propel the STM downrange. The (2.2), 
(2.3), and (2.4) subfunctions, Control Pitch, Yaw and Roll, describe the requirement for 
control of the attitude of the airframe in flight. The final subfunction, 2.5, Generate 
Guidance Command, describes the requirement that both programmed maneuvers (Such 
as tipover, flare, and others) and remote guidance commands can be processed and 
translated into appropriate control surface actuation. 
Record Data: This function describes the requirement that data relevant to the 
readiness or training evolution being conducted is recorded for later analysis. The (3.1) 
subfunction, Record Flight Data, describes the need to gather and save all telemetry data 
from the flight, to include acceleration commands, positioning of control surfaces, and 
relevant events, such as rocket motor burnout. The (3.2) subfunction, Record Commands, 
describes the required capability to record all externally generated commands received by 
the missile. These could include midcourse guidance commands and terminal homing. 
The final subfunction, (3.3), Format Data, describes the requirement that all collected 
data, whether digital or analog, be properly formatted to expedite future analysis.  
Ensure Recovery: This function describes the requirement that the STM be 
survivable, such that it may be recovered for later reuse. The subfunction (4.1) describes 
the requirement that the airframe survive impact with and submersion in seawater. 
Implicit in this subfunction the requirement that sufficient water-tight integrity is 
maintained to prevent water intrusion into sensitive electronics compartments. The 
subfunction (4.2), Transmit Location, describes the required function of broadcasting, 
either visually or electronically, the location of the airframe after water entry to facilitate 
recovery. The (4.3) subfunction, Maintain Buoyancy, describes the requirement that 
sufficient buoyancy be maintained while in the water to support the airframe at the 
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surface. Implied in this requirement is that the buoyancy will be distributed such that an 
attitude conducive to recovery is maintained.  
Minimize Safety Risk: This function describes the requirement that the STM 
shall be safe for usage by fleet units. Despite lacking a warhead, a solid-rocket motor is 
inherently a potential hazard in a maritime environment, and adequate safety is required 
during all phases of the STM’s life cycle. The subfunction (5.1), Control Firebreaks, 
describes the requirement that electronic firebreaks be utilized to prevent inadvertent 
firing of the STM. A system such as AEGIS has multiple electronic firebreaks, but this 
function should encompass multiple approaches to ensure that in the event the STM is 
used in a different configuration. The subfunction (5.2), Interface with VLS Deluge, 
describes the requirement that when utilized in a VLS configuration, the STM canister 
will be required to attach to the deluge system, if installed, to provide cooling in the event 
of a fire or restrained firing event. The subfunction (5.3), Comply with Command 
Destruct, describes the requirement that, if ordered, the STM shall terminate its flight 
promptly to prevent hazarding aircraft, surface vessels, or others. The subfunction (5.4), 
Adhere to Altitude Limits, describes the required function of adhering to programmed 
minimum and maximum altitudes to allow for safe operation. 
Power Systems: This function describes the requirement that electrical power 
sufficient to operate all onboard subsystems shall be incorporated into the design of the 
STM. The (6.1) subfunction, Provide DC Power, describes the requirement that adequate 
Direct Current electrical power be provided to all subsystems for the duration of a flight 
cycle. The (6.2) subfunction, Regulate Power, describes the requirement that voltage and 
amperage be regulated to provide different subsystems with different power requirements 
the proper power. The (6.3) subfunction, Distribute Power, describes the requirement that 
regulated power be distributed to all required subsystems.  
2. Detailed Functional Definitions 
Having defined the top-level system functionality in the preceding section, the 
next step is to decompose the identified functions further. This detailed functional 
requirement will identify additional functional needs for the conceptual STM. 
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a. Manage Interfaces Function 
Managing the various interfaces of the AEGIS combat system is a key functional 
need. Key interfaces that must be established and maintained for the STM to properly 
operate are shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  Detailed Decomposition of (1.0) Manage Interfaces Function 
Interface with VLS: This function is comprised of the (1.1.1) and (1.1.2) 
Interface with LSEQ and LCU subfunctions. These describe the requirement that the 
STM software be compatible with and recognizable by the VLS subsystems such that the 
STM can be properly identified by the onboard Weapons Control System. The (1.1.3) 
subfunction, Interface with Gas Management, describe the requirement that the canister 
used for the STM must properly physically interface with the gas management subsystem 
of VLS. For instance, if a Mk 22 or modified Mk 13 canister is selected for use, the 
appropriate canister adapter must be present to route missile exhaust into the plenum 
assembly of the launcher. Inherent in this subfunction is the requirement that missile 
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exhaust produced is within tolerances for operation within VLS. The (1.1.4) subfunction, 
Interface with Umbilical, describes the requirement that the common umbilical connector 
used in VLS be fully compatible with the STM canister.  
Interface with AN/SPY-1: This function describes the requirement that all 
variants of the AN/SPY-1 radar be compatible with the STM. Its (1.2.1) and (1.2.2) 
subfunctions, Receive and Transmit Missile Uplink/Downlink, describe the requirement 
that the STM possess a transceiver capability coupled to onboard computing and software 
capable of receiving, processing, and correctly responding to midcourse guidance updates 
from the AN/SPY-1 radar system. The (1.2.3) subfunction, Respond to Commands, 
describe the requirement that midcourse guidance commands, command destruct, and 
other ordered functions be routed properly through the STM’s onboard computing device 
such that the appropriate subsystems are properly directed. For instance, a command to 
alter course should generate a command to the flight control subsystem. The (1.2.4) 
subfunction, Measure Amplitude, describes the requirement that calibrated measurement 
of each received RF signal from the AN/SPY-1 radar shall take place for the duration of 
the STM’s flight. This data will later be used to extrapolate the maximum range of 
coherence for AN/SPY-1 uplink. 
Interface with AN/SPG-62: This function describe the requirement that the STM 
be capable of receiving and responding appropriately to Fire Control Continuous Wave 
Illumination (CWI). The subfunction (1.3.1) Receive Rear Reference CWI describes the 
requirement that the STM shall be capable of receiving the reference CWI signal output 
by the ancillary feedhorn of the AN/SPG-62. The (1.3.2) subfunction, Receive Reflected 
CWI, describes the requirement that the STM be capable of receiving the reflected main 
beam illumination from the target. The (1.3.3) subfunction, Measure CWI Amplitude, 
describes the requirement for measurement of the received signal intensity. 
Interface with Data Extraction: This function describe the necessity to be 
capable of interfacing with a Data Extraction subsystem suitable for data analysis and 
firing test result display. The subfunction (1.4.1), Output Suitable Format, describes the 
requirement that collected data be compiled into a format that is suitable for rapid 
extraction and analysis. For instance, ordered deflection angle of the control surfaces over 
 39 
time could be compiled by the onboard software using Comma Separated Values (CSV), 
thus allowing the data to be imported into any number of open source software analysis 
programs. The subfunction (1.4.2), Allow Media Extraction, describes the requirement 
that onboard data recording media be easily accessible to allow for rapid post-mission 
data transfer.  
Interface with Recovery System: This function describes the requirement that 
various recovery subsystems be physically compatible with the STM itself. The 
subfunction (1.5.1), Provide Lifting Points, describes the requirement that the STM be 
configured with accessible lifting points suitable for the attachment of a harness or 
strong-back type lifting device. This would facilitate easy lifting of the STM airframe by 
helicopter or crane, depending on the recovery method. The (1.5.2) subfunction, Provide 
Securing Points, describes the requirement that the STM airframe will be capable of 
being secured for transit, either to a cradle or within a shipment canister. This is a 
separate requirement from the method used to secure it within the firing canister. The 
(1.5.3) subfunction, Permit Access While Secured, describes the requirement that critical 
portions of the STM be accessible regardless of the securing method employed.  This 
would permit data extraction and limited inspection, troubleshooting, and maintenance of 
the electronic subsystems of the STM while the airframe was secured.  
b. Control Flight 
The ability to maintain controlled flight is critical to the safe and effective use of 
the STM in a fleet environment. This top level function’s subordinate functions are 
detailed in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9.  Detailed Decomposition of (2.0) Control Flight Functions 
Produce Thrust: This function describes the requirement that the STM be 
capable of generating thrust to propel itself downrange. The (2.1.1) subfunction, Arm 
Rocket Motor, describes the requirement that, on command, the Rocket Motor be capable 
of being armed remotely for firing. The (2.1.2) subfunction, Ignite Rocket Motor, 
describes the requirement for the safe remote ignition of the rocket motor. 
Control Pitch: This function describes the requirement that the STM be able to 
control its pitch attitude in controlled flight. The (2.2.1) subfunction, Receive Guidance 
Command, describes the requirement that the subsystem responsible for actuation of 
control surfaces be capable of translating programmed or remote guidance commands 
into orders for the control surfaces. The (2.2.2) subfunction, Deflect Control Surfaces, 
describes the requirement that control surfaces be actuated in such a manner that they 
produce the magnitude of pitch change needed to execute the guidance command. The 
(2.2.3) subfunction, Vector Thrust, describes the requirement that thrust vectoring be 
used, as applicable, either in conjunction with or independent of control surface 
deflection, to make pitch adjustments as required. The (2.2.4) subfunction, Monitor 
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Lateral Acceleration, describes the requirement that the magnitude of acceleration 
produced by control surface actuation or thrust vectoring is monitored and recorded. 
Control Yaw: This function describes the requirement that the STM be capable 
of controlling the yaw of its airframe in controlled flight. The Subfunctions (2.3.1 – 
2.3.4) are functionally identical to those described in “Control Pitch” but are related to a 
different axis. 
Control Roll: This function describes the STM’s required ability to control the 
roll of its airframe in controlled flight. The (2.4.1) subfunction, Receive Attitude 
Command, describes the requirement that the control subsystem be capable of receiving 
roll attitude commands and translating them into proper actuation of control surfaces. The 
subfunction (2.4.2), Deflect Control Surfaces, describes the requirement that control 
surfaces be actuated in such a manner that roll control in maintained for the duration of 
controlled flight. The subfunction (2.4.3), Monitor Rate of Roll, describes the 
requirement that the airframe’s rate of roll is measured and recorded throughout the flight 
event. 
Generate Guidance Commands: This function describes the requirement that 
appropriate guidance commands be provided to support safe controlled flight. The (2.5.1) 
subfunction, Process Programmed Guidance, describes the requirement that pre-
programmed maneuvers are executed during flight. This would include adherence to both 
minimum and maximum altitude limits, missile tipover, and post-intercept pitchup.  The 
(2.5.2) subfunction, Receive Remote Guidance, describes the requirement that the 
onboard guidance subsystem be capable of receiving remote guidance commands, either 
in the form of AN/SPY-1 midcourse guidance updates or AN/SPG-62 terminal guidance. 
The subfunction (2.5.3), Avoid Target, describes the requirement that the relative 
position to the target is tracked, and that the STM maneuvers to avoid collision with the 
target. This could be accomplished in any number of ways, from use of a transponder to 
tracking the intensity of the reflected CWI from the target. 
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c. Record Data 
The ability to format and record significant flight and combat systems data allows 
the STM to contribute to the readiness of the firing unit. The subordinate functions of this 
top-level function are depicted in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  Detailed Decomposition of (3.0) Record Data Functions 
Record Flight Data: This function describes the requirement that flight data of 
the STM be recorded for post-flight analysis. The (3.1.1) subfunction, Measure All-axis 
Acceleration, describes the requirement that acceleration forces experienced by the STM 
be measured and recorded. The (3.1.2) subfunction, Measure Control Surface Deflection, 
describes the requirement that deflection of control surfaces be measured and recorded. 
The (3.1.3) Monitor Current System Time, describes the requirement that an onboard 
clock be utilized to provide accurate time information for all recorded flight data. The 
(3.1.4) subfunction, Record Digital Data, describes the requirement that analog 
measurements of relevant flight data be converted to digital format for storage and later 
transfer. 
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Record Commands: This function describes the requirement that received 
commands be recorded. The (3.2.1) subfunction, Monitor Received Commands, describes 
the requirement that any command received via uplink is recorded for later analysis. The 
(3.2.2) subfunction, Monitor Current System Time, describes the requirement that an 
onboard clock be utilized to provide accurate time information for all recorded flight 
data. The (3.2.3) subfunction, Record Digital Data, describes the requirement that analog 
data (such as AN/SPG-62 intensity) be converted to digital format for storage and later 
transfer. 
Format Data: This function describes the requirement that all recorded data be 
formatted to expedite transfer and analysis. The (3.3.1) subfunction, Consolidate 
Recorded Data, describes the requirement that recorded data be compiled into a common 
file or files. The (3.3.2) subfunction, Create Data File, describes the requirement that 
either pre-flight or post-flight, a file or files are created to organize recorded data. The 
(3.3.3) subfunction, Organize Data by Time, describes the requirement that timestamp 
data is associated with each data entry to allow reconstruction of flight events during 
analysis. The (3.3.4) subfunction, Populate Data File, describes the requirement that 
created files be populated with compiled data throughout the flight test event. 
d. Ensure Recovery 
Providing a means to safely and expeditiously recover the STM following a firing 
event is a key component in cost reductions realized through multiple firings. The 
decomposition of this top level function is depicted in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  Detailed Decomposition of (4.0) Ensure Recovery Functions 
Survive Water Entry: This function describes the requirement that the STM be 
designed to withstand the forces associated with water entry. The (4.1.1) subfunction, 
Stabilize Airframe, describes the requirement that, post-intercept, the airframe assume a 
controlled, stable attitude. The (4.1.2) subfunction, Decelerate Airframe, describes the 
requirement that the STM airframe be decelerated at a sufficient rate to prevent damage 
upon impact with the water. The (4.1.3) subfunction, Withstand Impact, describes the 
requirement that the airframe possess inherent structural integrity to withstand impact 
with seawater if stabilized and sufficiently decelerated. 
Transmit Location: This function describes the requirement that the location of 
the STM post-flight be transmitted to facilitate recovery. The (4.2.1) subfunction, 
Transmit Location Visually, describes the requirement for a means of visually indicating 
the position of the STM in the water post-splashdown, such as via dye marker or flashing 
strobe light. The (4.2.2) subfunction, Transmit Location via RF, describes the 
requirement that an RF signal be transmitted post-splashdown of sufficient intensity to be 
received by aircraft or ships in the vicinity. This transmitted signal may either contain 
location information, or be simply utilized for direction finding. 
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Maintain Buoyancy: This function describes the requirement that the STM 
airframe possess enough buoyancy to remain afloat and to facilitate easy recovery. The 
(4.3.1) subfunction, Provide Buoyant Force, describes the requirement that sufficient 
buoyancy is provided to maintain the STM at the surface of the water. This could be 
accomplished via inherent buoyancy built into the airframe, with a separate subsystem 
that uses inflatable supports, or through some combination of the two. The (4.3.2) 
subfunction, Maintain Watertight Integrity, describes the requirement that water not be 
capable of flooding portions of the STM once in the water. This serves both to maintain 
buoyancy and to protect onboard electronic components. The subfunction (4.3.3), 
Maintain Proper Attitude, describes the requirement that the STM airframe assume and 
maintain an attitude in the water conducive to recovery efforts. 
e. Minimize Risk 
Minimizing the safety risks involved with utilizing the STM with VLS and in a 
fleet environment is critical to fulfilling stakeholder needs. The various subordinate 
functions that are required to mitigate potential risks to safety are shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12.  Detailed Decomposition of (5.0) Minimize Risk Functions 
Control Firebreaks: This function describes the requirement that suitable 
firebreaks be installed to prevent inadvertent firing and safety during handling, storage, 
and at-sea operations. The (5.1.1) subfunction, Provide CSES Functionality, describes the 
requirement that a Canister Safe/Enable Switch be installed on the STM canister and 
interface with the STM such that when made safe, the Rocket Motor cannot be armed or 
fired. The (5.1.2) subfuntion, Arm/Safe Rocket on Command, describes the requirement 
that remote arming and safe/arm capability be provided for the rocket motor assembly of 
the STM.  
Interface with VLS Deluge: This function describes the requirement that VLS 
deluge can be used on the STM in the event of a restrained firing. The only subfunction 
(5.2.1), Provide Canister Connection, describes the requirement that a connection be 
provided on the canister of the proper dimensions to accept VLS deluge. 
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Comply with Command Destruct: This function describes the requirement that 
remote termination of the STM in flight can be accomplished via AWS commands. The 
(5.3.1) subfunction, Receive Command Destruct, describes the requirement that the 
onboard electronics be capable of receiving, processing, and complying with a Command 
Destruct. The (5.3.2) subfunction, Terminate Flight, describes the requirement that the 
STM be capable of abrupt termination of flight upon receipt of a Command Destruct. 
This can be accomplished any number of ways, but it is important to note the lack of a 
warhead limits the options significantly. 
Adhere to Altitude Limits: This function describes the requirement that 
programmed altitude limits are adhered to. The (5.4.1) subfunction, Monitor Altitude, 
describes the requirement that real-time altitude data be continuously monitored and 
compared to programmed altitude limits. The subfuntion (5.4.2), Comply with Min/Max 
Altitude, describes the requirement that the guidance and control subsystems work 
together to maintain missile flight within programmed altitude limits within a safe 
tolerance band. 
f. Power Systems 
Providing electrical power to the various subsystems of the STM is an 
overarching requirement for its operation. Figure 13 details the subordinate functions that 
ensure power delivery during STM operations. 
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Figure 13.  Detailed Decomposition of (6.0) Power Systems Functions 
Provide DC Power: This function describes the requirement that all subsystems 
be provided stable DC power throughout all phases of operation. The subfunction (6.1.1) 
Accept External Power, describes the requirement that the STM be capable of receiving 
power from an external source, such as via Mk 41 VLS umbilical connection. This would 
be the primary power source during pre-flight to prevent premature battery depletion. The 
subfunction (6.1.2), Provide Internal Power, describes the requirement that the STM have 
an onboard power source capable of providing power to all onboard subsystems for the 
duration of flight operations.  
Regulate Power: This function describes the requirement that power from any 
source be regulated to prevent damage to subsystem components. The subfunction 
(6.2.1), Regulate Voltage, describes the requirement that onboard voltage be regulated to 
provide the proper voltage to subsystem components. This may require either stepping-up 
or stepping-down of the power source’s supply voltage. Implied in this requirement are 
output voltage stability and elimination of ripple voltage from the power source, as well 
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as potentially some level of EMI filtering. The subfunction (6.2.2), Regulate Amperage, 
describes the requirement that current supplied by the power source be regulated. 
Distribute Power: This function describes the requirement that power be 
distributed throughout the STM to all subsystems. No further decomposition of this 
particular function is required. 
B. FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION 
The functional allocation, or form-to-function mapping, attempts to describe how 
a system performs its various required functionality. The functions of a missile are 
already fairly well established, so for brevity’s sake, this section will cover only those 
functions which present the greatest risk or possess the most novelty in terms of mission 
design. A full functional allocation, complete with morphological analysis and value 
assessment, is out of scope of this report due to the highly conceptual nature of the 
proposed alternative. Despite this, various materiel alternatives for the novel functions 
performed by the concept will be discussed to assess feasibility and to aid in further 
analysis. 
1. Novel Function Allocation 
The most novel of the functions to be accomplished primarily revolve around the 
STM’s recovery capability. In addition to this, the lack of a warhead presents a challenge 
to completing the Command Destruct function. Various novel functions identified in the 
preceding decomposition are listed in Table 3. These functions are each provided with 
multiple materiel alternatives for consideration. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, 
but rather to assist in identifying the tradespace and design decisions that will need to be 
considered to bring the STM concept to fruition. 
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Table 3.   Materiel Solution Alternatives for Selected Functions 
a. Interface with Recovery System 
The Recovery System for the STM is envisioned as being flexible and adaptable 
to various means of recovery. In order for the airframe to be recovered post-flight, 
allocations must be made for the lifting of the airframe from the water by helicopter or 
crane. The simplest way to accomplish this would be to have recessed lugs that would 
allow the attachment of eye bolts or other implements to allow the airframe to be easily 
attached to a lifting device. In addition, the airframe must be reinforced near these lugs to 
prevent damage as the weight of the airframe is transferred onto the lugs. The Provide 
Securing Points function would require consideration of the means of transport. Ideally, 
the airframe would be placed and then secured via any manner of means to some form of 
cradle.  
Once secured in the cradle, access to the interior of the airframe and electronic 
components within for inspection, test, or data extraction must be accomplished. To 
permit this, again, the design of the cradle must be considered, and access panel 
placement informed by the chosen design so no physical interference occurs. The means 
FUNCTION MATERIEL SOLUTION ALTERNATIVES
1.5 Interface with Recovery System
1.5.1 Provide Lifting Points Recessed lugs, Reinforced sections
1.5.2 Provide Securing Points Reinforced Sections, bands or straps, threaded holes
4.1 Survive Water Entry
4.1.1 Stabilize Airframe Drogue, airbrake, control surface orientation
4.1.2 Decelerate Airframe Climb-out, parachute (single or multiple canopy)
4.1.3 Withstand Impact
Reinforced airframe, shock-hardened electronics enclosure, 
reinforced control surfaces
4.2 Transmit Location
4.2.1 Transmit Location Visually Strobe light, dye marker, smoke generator, reflective paint
4.2.2 Transmit Location via RF MOBI-type transmitter, HF beacon, miniturized AIS transponder
4.3 Maintain Buoyancy
4.3.1 Provide Buoyant Force Inherent design buoyancy, air trapping, airbag system
4.3.2 Maintain Watertight Integrity Resilient seals and/or gaskets
4.3.3 Maintain Proper Attitude Design consideration for center of buoyancy
5.3 Comply with Command Destruct
5.3.2 Terminate Flight Explosive charge, maneuver, rocket motor jettison
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of panel access must also be considered. For example, tool-less access would be ideal for 
rapid access while in the field, but the cost-benefit of such schemes would have to be 
considered. 
b. Survive Water Entry 
The survival of the missile over multiple launch and recovery cycles is a key 
function in driving down the cost per firing. To accomplish this function, the airframe 
must first be stabilized, then slowed to an acceptable rate of descent prior to water entry. 
Stabilizing the missile after fuel exhaustion could be accomplished by deploying a 
drogue, or by reconfiguring the control surfaces to provide a stabilizing force. 
Deceleration would best be accomplished by a variety of means due to the high velocity 
of the airframe. Assuming fuel exhaustion at the intercept point, a climb-out would allow 
the airspeed to bleed off and allow for safe deployment of a parachute or parachutes. 
Because the airframe will impact the water with some velocity, it is also important to 
consider the design of the onboard electronics. They should be configured in a shock-
tolerant mounting to withstand both launch and impact forces. Additionally, the airframe 
itself and the control surfaces should be robust enough to withstand the force of water 
impact. 
c. Transmit Location 
To facilitate rapid recovery, the firing unit or designated recovery unit must be 
capable of rapidly locating the STM airframe after each firing event. Multiple effective 
means exist. To visually determine the location of the airframe, a variety of means could 
potentially be employed, from a salt water-activated strobe light, to dye markers that 
deploy on impact, to reflective paint or tape on the airframe itself. Electronically locating 
the airframe would be helpful in the initial search phase, and means employed to 
accomplish this would include the use of a MOBI-type transponder, a simple HF beacon 
that would allow for direction finding, or even a miniaturized AIS transponder that would 
transmit the precise GPS location of the airframe.  
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d. Maintain Buoyancy 
To permit the recovery of the airframe post-flight, it is imperative that the 
airframe maintain buoyancy such that it remains at the surface of the water. To do so, 
some buoyant force must be present. This could be provided by inherent design 
buoyancy—the use of lightweight materials, air-tight compartments filled with some 
buoyant material, or even an airbag system that inflates upon impact with the water. 
Alternatively, or in conjunction with other methods, the entrapment of air within the solid 
rocket motor casing could be accomplished by designing the airframe to enter the water 
with the rocket motor facing downward, similar to the Space Shuttle’s solid rocket 
boosters.17  
Once in the water, buoyancy must be maintained for some duration to allow the 
firing unit or designated recovery unit time to locate and recover the airframe. To ensure 
this, and to prevent damage to sensitive electronic components, all accesses to areas of 
the interior of the airframe that contain electronics or are buoyant compartments must be 
sealed. Gasket materials would have to be resilient to the effects of aerodynamic heating 
and exposure to salt water. Additionally, RF windows or airframe-mounted antennas 
would have to be both watertight and impervious to salt water.  
Finally, the attitude that the airframe assumes in the water must be conducive to 
rapid and safe recovery. Accomplishing this requires that the placement of buoyant 
compartments or external apparatuses must be deliberate, such that the sum of provided 
buoyant forces maintains the airframe in a desired orientation once in the water. 
e. Comply with Command Destruct 
With no warhead, compliance with ordered self-destruction is not as 
straightforward as it would be with a conventional missile. One option to enable this 
would be to place a small charge at the base of the solid rocket motor, such that when 
triggered, the solid rocket motor’s remaining fuel is detonated. This, however, would 
likely leave much of the airframe intact, and traveling in the same relative direction. 
                                                 
17 “Solid Rocket Boosters,” NASA, last modified August 31, 2000, 
http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/technology/sts-newsref/srb.html 
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Another option would be for the missile to pitch steeply downward and impact the water. 
Again, the results would be unpredictable, as the rocket motor could survive impact and 
continue to burn, propelling the missile through the water or causing porpoising. Another 
potential way to terminate flight would be to separate the rocket motor from the airframe 
through some means. This would cause unpredictable trajectories for both the rocket 
motor and the airframe, however. Ultimately, the decision for which method of flight 
termination to use will be contingent on testing various methods to ensure they do not 
compromise the safety of the round for use in a fleet environment. 
f. Avoid Target 
Unlike a Standard Missile or ESSM operating with a WCT installed, there is no 
need to drive the STM and target into close range with one another. With no Target 
Detection Device (TDD) on the STM, the amount of data to be gathered by such a close 
encounter is minimal at best, and outweighed by the potential cost of a collision with the 
target drone and loss of both the drone and the STM. Numerous ways exist to prevent or 
minimize the risk of collision. The most straightforward would be altitude deconfliction, 
where the minimum altitude of the STM is set to be some distance above the 
programmed flight altitude of the target drone. Another means would be through the use 
of a transmitter on the target drone. Transmitting at fixed amplitude, a receiver on the 
STM could judge its distance from the target and evade by pitching upward as required. 
Another would be to set a threshold of amplitude for the received reflected RF from the 
CWI system. Excursions above a set amplitude threshold would prompt the STM to pitch 
upward to avoid collision. 
2. Canister Alternatives 
Depending on its configuration, a STM may or may not require a dedicated 
canister. All Aegis-configured STMs, however, will require a canister, so a discussion of 
alternatives is prudent. Assuming the STM is designed with a 10-inch airframe diameter, 
only two extant canister options are available. This diameter would put it in the same size 
class as the NSSM, ESSM, and Patriot PAC-3 missile and thus maximize its adaptability 
to various launchers, and thus should be considered a design requirement. The two 
 54 
canister options are therefore the Mk 22 and the Mk 25. The Mk 22 canister is designed 
to allow the use of RIM-7 NSSM rounds with the Mk 41 VLS, while the Mk 25 is a 
quad-pack designed to adapt the RIM-162 ESSM to Mk 41 VLS.18  
One option would thus be to utilize the quad-pack loaded with one STM and three 
ESSMs. The advantage to this would lie in the fact that ships would have a STM ready at 
hand for testing or training purposes. There would be no need to return to port to load a 
STM specifically to conduct a training shot. The disadvantages would be that there would 
be a danger that the STM could be expended against an actual target, there would be a 
reduction in the number of defensive missiles carried, and if fired, the canister would 
possibly need to remain on the ship for an extended amount of time before being returned 
for overhaul. The use of the Mk 22 canister would require loading followed by a post-
firing offload, but this would help make the STM firing a discrete event and would not 
require ships to deploy with one cell wasted on a test missile. Being able to remove the 
canister and rapidly recondition it is key in preventing oxidative corrosion caused by 
missile exhaust residue, as noted in Chapter III. A third option would be to repurpose Mk 
13 canisters as the SM-2 inventory declines. This would provide canisters at essentially 
no cost, although they would require significant modification of their launch rail to accept 
a 10-inch diameter missile among other things, adding an unknown cost.  
C. SUMMARY 
The analysis presented here decomposed the various functions required for 
successful development and implementation of a STM, and began the process of mapping 
form to function. Six top-level functions were identified and decomposed into 
subordinate functions, these were; manage interfaces, control flight, record data, ensure 
recovery, minimize risk, and provide power. Further study and review by engineers of the 
applicable disciplines will ensure the validity of the functions described here, as well as 
their applicability to a specific configuration of STM. Having analyzed the functions 
necessary for safe and effective operation of the STM, the next step is to determine 
requirements for the system. 
                                                 
18 “VLS Mk 41 Canisters,” BAE Systems Land And Armaments, accessed April 14, 2014, 
http://www.baesystems.com/download/BAES_046051/vls-mk-41-missile 
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V. REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 
Drawing from the proposed concept of operations and the functions decomposed 
for the STM, a list of formalized requirements can be generated. These requirements 
dictate the threshold and goal performance for a variety of operational performance 
measures. Due to the highly conceptual nature of this report, a full functionally-derived 
requirements list is not developed. This chapter instead examines the critical operational 
issues (COI) that contribute to the feasibility and efficacy of the STM, and put in place 
measures of effectiveness and measures of performance from which to consider detailed 
system-level requirements. High-level requirements that affect design decisions are 
discussed, as well as means to verify their performance. 
A. CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
When holistically considering the STM concept, it becomes obvious that there are 
a number of issues that could derail the proposed concept of operations as well as the 
potential cost advantages of the concept if not addressed early in the Systems 
Engineering process. These issues were explored with the various technical stakeholders, 
and are here broken down and examined in detail. 
As depicted in Table 4, five critical operational issues were identified as 
challenges to the successful development and cost-effective fielding of the STM concept. 
These issues are explored in a more detailed fashion by identifying measures of 




Table 4.   Critical Operational Issues identified for the Surrogate Test Missile 
Concept. 
1. Survivability 
The survivability of the reusable STM concept is a key consideration. The 
reusability of the round after each flight is critical to offset the initial acquisition cost and 
to drive the cost-per-flight figure downward, as is explored in detail in the next chapter. 
How then to gauge the survivability of such a round? As shown in Table 5, three key 
considerations are the STM’s ability to survive all phases of multiple flights, the overall 
ruggedness of the airframe and its components, the proper functioning of all components 
of the recovery system, and the ability of the STM to avoid collision with that target. 
Other considerations that could affect the survivability of the round include the reliability 
of the flight control electronics and the reliability of the control surface actuators. 
To develop MOEs for survivability, the individual questions of the Critical 
Operational Issue are broken into component parts with a MOE assigned to each. These 
MOEs are further broken into component Measures of Performance. 
Critical Operational Issues COI Description
SURVIVABILITY
Can the STM be made to survive multiple flights?  Will the 
recovery system work as envisioned?  Will target collisions 
be avoidable?
SAFETY
Will the STM be safe to operate within a fleet environment?  
Is the STM safe to recover and transport?
INTEROPERABILITY
Can the STM be made compatible with multiple, disparate 
Combat Systems?
EFFECTIVENESS Is an STM firing event an effective test of installed Combat 
Systems?  Is the training provided by a STM launch effective?
MAINTAINABILITY




Table 5.   Survivability COI, Objectives, and Measures of Effectiveness. 
As is illustrated in Table 5, the survivability COI breaks down into multiple 
objectives and Measures of Effectiveness, which will be further broken down into 
Measures of Performance. These measures can be used as a basis for validating and 
verifying system and component-level requirements during both developmental and 
operational test and evaluation. The MOEs identified in Table 5 are next broken down 
further into MOPs, as shown in Table 6. 
COI Objective Measures Of Effectiveness
Average number of flights per 
airframe
Number of serious defects/Number 
of flight events
Average time required to locate 
airframe post-flight
Average time to recover airframe
Number of successful 
recoveries/Number of flights
Collision Avoidance 
Number of target 
Collisions/Number of flights
Airframe Lifespan





Table 6.   Survivability Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness and Performance. 
Each MOP identified in Table 6 contributes a verifiable data point for tracking 
throughout the concept’s developmental test and evaluation and into its operational life 
cycle. These MOPs are not all inclusive, but represent an attempt to begin to frame the 
requirements within the context of functional solutions.  
a. Airframe Lifespan 
This objective evaluates the lifespan of an in-service STM round. This objective 
is judged as a function of two MOEs. The first, Average number of flights per airframe, 
evaluates the number of flights each STM has performed successfully. As STMs are 
repeatedly expended during live-fire testing, the number of flights per airframe will be 
tracked by serial number. Upon retirement, the number of flights at retirement will be 
noted. By tracking these figures, an estimated lifespan can be calculated for future STM 
rounds. The next, Number of Serious Defects/Number of Flight Events, tracks the ratio of 
service-ending defect discoveries to the number of flights flown. A large number here 
Objective Measures Of Effectiveness Measures Of Performance
Average number of flights per 
airframe
Number of successful flights
Number of serious defects 
discovered during inspection
Number of flights flown by affected 
airframe
Time required to acquire RF beacon
Time required to visually acquire 
airframe
Time required to recover airframe 
via helo
Time required to recover airframe 
via RHIB
Time required for SAR swimmer to 
rig airframe for lift/tow
Overall number of successful 
recoveries
Overall number of flight events
Overall number of target collisions
Overall number of flight events
Number of serious defects/Number 
of flight events
Average time required to locate 
airframe post-flight
Average time to recover airframe
Number of successful 
recoveries/Number of flights
Airframe Lifespan
Effectiveness of Recovery System 




could indicate reliability or manufacturing defects that are limiting the number of flights 
each round can safely perform, or highlight areas that require further engineering. 
b. Effectiveness of Recovery System  
This objective is focused on the overall performance of the Recovery subsystems onboard 
the STM. There are three MOEs that assess the effectiveness of the recovery system. The 
first, Average time required to locate airframe post-flight, evaluates the performance of 
the locating devices, visual or electronic, onboard the STM. The next, Average time to 
recover airframe, aids in determining the performance characteristics of the various 
subsystems designed to facilitate the recovery and transport of the STM to the firing unit 
or designated recovery unit. The final MOP, Number of successful recoveries/Number of 
flights, evaluates the holistic performance of the location and recovery subsystems. 
Ideally, this figure would remain close to one, if the number were to grow significantly 
smaller, it could indicate a problem with subsystems or procedures. 
c. Collision Avoidance  
This objective evaluates the performance of the selected collision avoidance system or 
procedures. Its sole MOE, the ratio of the number of target collisions to the total number 
of flights, evaluates the likelihood of a target collision for any given flight. This MOE 
will evaluate whether the chosen alternative is effective at preventing collisions between 
the STM airframe and the target drone. Any event resulting in collision will be cause for 
investigation. 
2. Safety 
In order to feasibly use the STM in a fleet environment, it must be proven safe in 
all phases of flight. Pre-flight, it must be stable and provide firebreaks when installed in 
VLS. It must be identifiable as a test missile both visually and electronically. In flight, it 
must be controllable. Post-flight, it must be able to be recovered without posing undue 




Table 7.   Safety COI, Objectives, and Measures of Effectiveness  
The Safety COI is decomposed into three Objectives and seven Measures of 
Effectiveness in Table 7. While, again, not all inclusive, these objectives and MOEs set 
verifiable expectations for both test and evaluation as well as for operational 
performance. Critical objectives are determined to be Safe VLS Operation, Safe Flight 
Performance, and Recovery Safety. There is some overlap in MOEs between safety and 
survivability in the Recovery Safety objective, as a key element of both safety and long-
term survivability is the time required to recover the airframe post-flight. The identified 
MOEs are next further broken out into MOPs. 
COI Objective Measures Of Effectiveness
Average maximum temperature of 
adjacent cells during restrained 
firing
Restrained firing or misfire/Number 
of attempted launches
Average deviation from 
programmed min/max altitude
Departures from expected flight 
path/Number of flights
Percentage of successful command 
destruct signals
Average amount of time required to 
recover airframe








Table 8.   Safety Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness and Performance  
The breakdown of MOEs into component MOPs in Table 8 is, again, not 
exhaustive. Further evaluation would be required based on design decisions prior to the 
commencement of DT&E. 
a. Safe VLS Operation 
This objective is primarily concerned with gauging the risk these rounds pose to 
the firing unit through their interface with the Mk 41 VLS. One key consideration is the 
ability of the canister to protect adjacent cells from the potential for heat damage in the 
event of a restrained firing. High temperatures could be indicative of failure of interface 
Objective Measures Of Effectiveness Measures Of Performance
Average maximum temperature of 
adjacent cells during restrained 
firing
Maximum temperature recorded in 
each adjacent cell during restrained 
firing
Number of restrained firing events
Number of misfires
Overall number of attempted 
launches
Maximum recorded deviation from 
programmed minimum altitude
Maximum recorded deviation from 
programmed maximum altitude
Overall number of departures from 
flight path
Overall number of flight events
Overall number of ordered 
command destruct events
Overall number of expected flight 
terminations
Time required to recover airframe 
via helo
Time required to recover airframe 
via RHIB
Time required for SAR swimmer to 
rig airframe for lift/tow
Overall number of recovery 
attempts 
Overall number of successful 
recovery attempts
Restrained firing or misfire/Number 
of attempted launches
Safe VLS Operation
Average deviation from 
programmed min/max altitude
Departures from expected flight 
path/Number of flights
Percentage of successful command 
destruct signals
Average amount of time required to 
recover airframe





with the deluge or gas management system. Another is the restrained fire or misfire rate 
of the STM. Problems here could indicate issues with rocket motor arming circuits, 
launch rail design, hold-down bolts, and other hardware or electronic design issues. 
b. Safe Flight Performance 
Any missile flight operation is inherently hazardous, so assessing the controlled 
flight of the STM is a critical consideration for safety. The first Measure of Effectiveness 
assesses the STM’s ability to maintain programmed altitude limits. Issues with 
maintaining altitude could cause the missile to impact the sea surface, the target drone, or 
leave the dogbox put in place for the missile flight. All are potential hazards. Problems 
with maintaining altitude could stem from hardware or software issues. The next MOE is 
concerned with the STM’s ability to maintain controlled flight downrange. Deviations in 
flight path are potentially hazardous, even if they do not violate altitude limits. If 
observed, these deviations could signal issues with flight control hardware or software. 
Finally, the STM’s ability to terminate its flight is key to reducing the hazards such a 
round would represent, especially in a fleet firing environment with multiple ships. 
c. Recovery Safety 
The ability to be recovered safely is critical to achieving the goal of a truly 
reusable round. MOEs include the time required to recover the round and the percentage 
of recovery attempts that are successful. The time required to recover the round impacts 
the safety of the personnel involved in the recovery attempt, specifically the boat and/or 
helicopter crews and the SAR swimmer. The percentage of successful recovery attempts 
is similar in that the underlying assumption is the more attempts required to recover the 
airframe, the longer duration of time recovery crew will be required to be engaged in 
recovery operations. 
3. Interoperability 
While the STM may initially be developed for only one specific combat system, 
by designing flexibility into the onboard software and hardware, the STM could 
conceivably emulate any number of missile systems. This, in turn, would increase the 
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acquisition quantity and derive some cost benefit from doing so. The MOEs identified 






 Combat Systems 
Compatibility 
Number of Combat Systems STM is 
compatible with 
Average number of modifications 
required to achieve compatibility 
Table 9.   Interoperability COI, Objective, and Measures of Effectiveness 
a. Combat Systems Compatibility 
As shown in Table 9, Interoperability will be assessed primarily as a function of 
how many systems the STM can be made compatible with, through either software or 
hardware modification. The number of modifications required to permit the compatibility 
would be an important cost driver in making cross-platform interoperability feasible, and 
is thus the second MOE.  
4. Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the STM will primarily be a function of its ability to verify 
the readiness of the firing unit’s installed combat system and the training its use provides 
to key watchstanders. The ability to verify the readiness of the combat system for the 
Aegis-specific STM is a function of its ability to test the VLS interconnections, which 
must function for the missile to receive the launch command, and once launched, its 
ability to receive and measure radiation from the AN/SPY-1 radar and AN/SPG-62 
illuminator. The training effectiveness of the round is a function of its ability to emulate 
the specific missile it is simulating as well as how the firing scenario is framed and 
conducted by the firing unit. The breakdown of various related objectives into MOEs is 




Table 10.   Effectiveness COI, Objectives, and Measures of Effectiveness 
a. Training Effectiveness and Realism 
To assess the effectiveness and realism of the training conducted using the STM 
is a difficult task.  One metric that can be used is a simple analysis of that number of 
additional firing opportunities granted through the STM’s reduced cost and range 
requirements. Another is the reported fidelity and satisfaction of watchstanders on firing 
units. Ideally, Afloat Training Groups and Tactical Training Groups would be leveraged 
to provide baseline training scenarios and metrics for diverse firing units so that there is 
uniformity in the use of the STM. 
b. Readiness Verification Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the STM’s ability to verify the operability of the firing unit’s 
combat systems suite is measured through four MOEs. The first is the percentage of 
critical combat systems functions verified by the STM. This will vary between different 
systems if the STM concept is expanded to different combat systems. The delta between 
the percentage that are able to be tested synthetically and the percentage tested by the 
STM is one measure of the benefits provided by the STM concept. The next three are a 
function of the faults or deficiencies found or corrected during any phase of an STM 
COI Objective Measures Of Effectiveness
Additional training opportunities 
allowed by STM 
Reported training fidelity and 
satisfaction
Percentage of critical CS functions 
verified by STM
Average number of deficiencies 
detected/corrected during pre-fire 
maintenance
Average number of deficiencies 
detected by STM
Average number of deficiencies 








firing event. The ability to detect, isolate, and correct faults prior to entering combat is a 
key readiness challenge, and these MOEs evaluate the STMs ability to do just that. 
5. Maintainability 
The maintainability COI assesses the overhaul portion of the STM life cycle. The 
primary objective is to minimize the time and complexity involved in any overhaul, 
which in turn is expected to drive the cost per firing cycle down. As such, the MOEs 
associated with this objective concern the man-hours being expended on various aspects 
of the overhaul, as well as parts required and the quality assurance aspects of the process. 
 
Table 11.   Maintainability COI, Objective, and Measures of Effectiveness 
The maintainability COI is assigned only one objective with five primary 
measures of effectiveness as shown in Table 11. These assess two of the main cost 
drivers for the reusable STM concept—the number of man-hours required to conduct 
inspection and overhaul of STM subsystems and the complexity of that inspection and 
overhaul. 
COI Objective Measures Of Effectiveness
Average number of manhours 
expended on airframe inspection
Average number of manhours 
expended on airframe overhaul
Average number of manhours 
expended on canister overhaul
Average number of parts requiring 
replacement during overhaul
Average number of STMs failing 
post-overhaul inspection
MAINTAINABILITY




Table 12.   Maintainability Objectives and Measures of Effectiveness and Performance 
The measures of performance identified in Table 12 are, again, not all inclusive. 
The MOPs derived from the Maintainability COI primarily focus on the time and 
resources required to overhaul the STM. They represent only an initial analysis of the 
issues associated with the maintainability of the STM and means to verify them. 
a. Minimize Overhaul Time and Complexity 
Assessing the maintainability of the STM can be accomplished by examining the 
number of man-hours required to conduct post-flight inspection and overhaul as well as 
the number of parts required to restore each STM to readiness.  These values can be 
tracked over the lifespan of each STM to assess patterns, or to detect potential design or 
implementation problems. Excessive man-hour expenditure on certain stages of the 
overhaul could potentially be rectified through better training, design changes, or 
component selection changes. Tracking the number of parts being replaced can also serve 
to provide warnings of design or component selection problems. While it is expected that 
certain components will need to be replaced after each firing event, for instance the Solid 
Rocket Motor and perhaps various gaskets and retaining hardware, higher than expected 
Objective Measures Of Effectiveness Measures Of Performance
Hours required to complete 
inspection of airframe
Personnel required to complete 
inspection of airframe
Hours required to complete 
overhaul of airframe
Personnel required to complete 
overhaul of airframe
Hours required to complete 
overhaul of canister
Personnel required to complete 
overhaul of canister
Average number of parts requiring 
replacement during overhaul
Number of parts replaced per 
overhaul
Average number of STMs failing 
post-overhaul inspection
Number of STMs failing post-
overhaul inspection/total number of 
overhauls
Average number of manhours 
expended on canister overhaul
Average number of manhours 
expended on airframe overhaul
Average number of manhours 
expended on airframe inspection
Minimize Overhaul Time 
and Complexity
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part replacement could signal design problems. Finally, assessing the post-overhaul 
inspection failure rate will allow program managers to identify problems with procedures 
and training that could impede the maintainability of the STM. 
B. HIGH-LEVEL REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT 
Drawing from stakeholder input, the concepts of operation, derived functionality, 
and assessed critical operational issues, the requirements for the concept are next mapped 
onto specific functions. Due to the conceptual nature of the STM at this stage, a full 
mapping of requirements to functions will not be performed. Analysis will instead focus 
on specific high-level and functional requirements that present the greatest challenge to 
the potential feasibility of the round as envisaged in this report. 
1. High Level System Requirements 
High-level systems requirements can be drawn from the identified Critical 
Operational Issues, and attempt to address the underlying questions regarding the system 
of systems as envisaged. These functions attempt to define the overall operational issues 
the STM will experience, and to build a framework to assist in the selection of initial 
design specifications. Again, this report is strictly conceptual, so throughout this section 
quantitative requirements may not be specifically defined. Any requirement that would 
typically have a numerical value associated with it will here be simply assigned a value 
of XX. While non-specific, this will allow for a more thorough analysis to assign more 
accurate numerical values following an investigation into the trade space and value 
system of each particular requirement. 
As illustrated in Table 13, even very high level requirements may be useful in 
making component selection and detailed design decisions. Some of these decisions will 
include the design and construction of the airframe, where cost and weight will be 
balanced against the requirement for it to be rugged enough to survive multiple flight 
cycles. Similarly, the design of the airframe and lift/tow harness will be determined by 
the requirement that the average SAR swimmer be capable of attaching the harness in a 
set amount of time. 
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Table 13.   High-level System Requirements derived from COIs. 
To next decompose top-level functionally-derived requirements for the STM, the 
functional hierarchy developed in Chapter IV was reviewed. 
As demonstrated in Table 14, these functional requirements possess more 
specificity than their system counterparts. Again, given the early stage of this report, 
specific values have not been determined. 
 
COI Example Requirement
The flight controls shall function with 0.XX reliability
The recovery subsystem shall allow 5th to 95th percentile SAR 
swimmers to attach lift/tow harness within 5 minutes
The STM shall fullfil XX% of training objectives for a live missile 
fired for telemetry
The STM overhaul shall require no more than XX special tools to 
complete
The STM airframe shall be capable of withstanding XX 
launch/recovery cycles
The STM recovery system shall function with 0.XX reliability
The collision avoidance system shall function with 0.XX reliability
The STM canister shall be compatible with VLS deluge and gas 
management systems.
The STM rocket motor shall have VLS compatible safety and arming 
systems installed.
The STM shall be configurable to enable function with other fire 
control and launch systems.
The STM shall test all firing circuits and interlocks of the weapons 
system during a launch cycle
The STM shall measure and record amplitude readings of all 
received RF missile guidance 
The STM inspection and overhaul shall require less than XX man-
hours to complete









Table 14.   Example Top Level Functional Requirements 
2. Functional Requirements 
Table 3 in Chapter IV provided a high-level look at possible design alternatives 
for functions that could be considered novel or high-risk. These functions provide an 
obvious starting point for the mapping of more detailed functional requirements.  
Example functional requirements for novel or high-risk functions are provided in 
Table 15. Of all the requirements described in this chapter, these are the most specific, 
and would drive decision makers toward specific choices in either design or component 
selection.  
 
TOP LEVEL FUNCTION EXAMPLE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
1.0 Manage Interfaces
R1.X The STM shall functionally interface with all AEGIS Weapons 
System elements
R2.X The STM shall be aerodynamically stable at speeds of up to XXX 
m/s at all altitudes.
R2.X The STM shall respond properly to all AN/SPY-1 midcourse 
guidance commands
R2.X The STM shall comply with programmed altitude limits with an 
accuracy of +/- X m 
R3.X The STM shall be capable of recording up to XXX s of flight data, 
to include all commands and measured amplitude of received RF
R3.X The data recording subsystem shall format all data as a .XXX file 
type of a size not to exceed XX MB
R4.X The STM airframe shall be capable of withstanding XX launch 
and recovery cycles
R4.X The STM airframe lifting harness shall be capable of attachment 
by 5th to 95th percentile SAR swimmers in under X minutes in up to 
Sea State 3
5.0 Minimize Risk
R5.X The STM flight control subsystem shall have a reliability of 
greater than 0.XX
R6.X The STM battery shall provide up to XX minutes of flight time.
R6.X The STM location beacon shall have adequate power to operate 







Table 15.   Example Functional Requirements Mapping for Novel Functions. 
C. SUMMARY 
The analysis in this chapter provided initial analysis into the Critical Operational 
Issues and the requirements required to be generated for the conceptual STM system-of-
systems. Five COIs were determined; survivability, safety, interoperability, effectiveness, 
and maintainability. The objectives, MOEs, and MOPs derived from these COIs serve as 
the rough frame for deriving requirements. Analyzing the requirements for such a system 
helps to frame the tradespace for a future detailed alternatives analysis, which in turn will 
inform the cost estimation process for such a system. While analysis at this level of detail 
is beyond the scope of this report, this chapter should provide decision-makers with 
enough information to approach the problem from a systems engineering perspective and 
further define the requirements and means to verify them going forward. Based on the 
FUNCTION EXAMPLE FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENT
1.5 Interface With Recovery System
1.5.1 Provide Lifting Points
R1.5.1 The lifting points shall withstand a static load of XXXlbs and 
a maximum dynamic load of XXXlbs
1.5.2 Provide Securing Points
R1.5.2 The STM airframe shall provide a minimum of X tie-down 
points capable of accepting a tension of XXXlbs
1.5.3 Permit Access While Secured
R1.5.3 Access to the electronics compartment shall not be impeded 
by attachment of harness or securing devices
4.1 Survive Water Entry
4.1.1 Stabilize Airframe
R4.1.1 The STM shall be capable of stabilization in a nose-forward 
configuration following solid rocket motor burnout
4.1.2 Decelerate Airframe
R4.1.2 The STM airframe shall be decelerated to a maximum speed 
of no greater than X m/s prior to water impact
4.1.3 Withstand impact
R4.1.3 All STM components, to include control surfaces, shall be 
capable of withstanding impact forces in excess of X Gs for a 
duration of XX ms
4.2 Transmit Location
4.2.1 Transmit Location Visually
R4.2.1 The STM recovery visual locating device shall be visible from X 
nm in unrestricted visibility conditions
4.2.2 Transmit Location via RF
R4.2.2 The STM recovery subsystem shall provide RF location 
information with a positional accuracy of +/- X m
4.3 Maintain Buoyancy
4.3.1 Provide Buoyant Force
R4.3.1 The STM airframe shall possess a buoyant force in excess of XXX 
lbs
4.3.2 Maintain Watertight Integrity
R4.3.2 All electronics enclosures shall remain watertight over a period 
of XX hours and when submerged to a depth of XX m
4.3.3 Maintain Proper Attitude
R4.3.3 The STM airframe shall remain in a horizontal configuration for a 
period of no less than XX hrs in sea conditions up to Sea State 3
5.3 Comply with Command Destruct
5.3.2 Terminate Flight
R5.3.2 The STM shall respond to Command Destruct order within XX ms 
and with 0.XX reliability
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analysis in this chapter, as well as the preceding analysis detailing the initial Concept of 
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VI. COST, LIFE CYCLE CONSIDERATIONS, AND POTENTIAL 
FURTHER APPLICATION 
A. STM COST ANALYSIS 
Estimating the cost of the STM is critical in determining the benefit the 
development and fielding of such a round would realize for the Fleet. This is complicated 
somewhat by the fact that it is a novel solution – no direct analogy currently exists, so 
assumptions must be made in estimating the cost of research and development (R&D), 
acquisition, and operations and support.   
1. Unique Cost Components of Surrogate Test Missile Program 
The development and fielding of the STM will incur costs in multiple, discrete 
areas. The STM is expected to follow the traditional program life cycle of research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), followed by production, followed by 
operations and support, and finally ending with disposal. The operations and support 
phase will have a unique cycle of firing costs followed by overhaul costs, which will 
briefly be described below. These costs will not be estimated in detail in this report due to 
their variable nature and the difficulty associated with doing so without a good source of 
analogous data.  
a. Firing Costs 
The firing costs for the STM will here be defined as all costs incurred in support 
of live-fire testing or training conducted using the STM, including; 
 Transportation of STM to ship and loading (as required) 
 Target Drone launch and recovery (if utilized) 
 Recovery Platform costs (if utilized) 
Each of these costs depends on a number of factors. The transportation costs will 
vary based on the ship’s location. For instance, a ship conducting a firing event out of 
Rota will incur a much higher transportation cost compared with a ship that loads a STM 
at Naval Weapons Station Yorktown. Target drone costs will vary with the type of drone 
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utilized, the firing range used, and the safe recovery of the drone. Finally, if, for whatever 
reason, the firing unit is unable to recover the STM unassisted, cost will be incurred in 
the form of a designated recovery platform. 
b. Overhaul Costs 
Overhaul costs for the STM will be defined as all costs incurred during the post-
firing overhaul and refurbishment of all STM components. These costs include; 
 Transportation of STM and canister to overhaul facility 
 STM inspection 
 STM component replacement 
 Canister refurbishment 
 STM – Canister mating 
 Quality Assurance Tests 
Overhaul costs, like firing costs depend on multiple factors, such as the condition 
of the STM and canister upon arrival at the designated overhaul facility. STMs that have 
been damaged, either through firing or through improper storage or transportation, will 
likely take longer to overhaul, or will necessitate a higher degree of component 
replacement. Similarly, STM canister refurbishment will be dependent on the condition 
of the canister upon arrival. Prolonged storage following a firing event with missile 
exhaust residue can cause accelerated canister corrosion and necessitate expensive repair 
procedures, and thus would have to be avoided whenever possible.19  
To a greater extent than firing costs, overhaul costs will be influenced by design 
decisions made during the development of the STM. Designing the round for 
maintainability, as discussed in Chapter V, will minimize the number of man-hours 
required to inspect and refurbish the round, and through this reduce the costs associated 
with the overhaul. Minimization of overhaul costs will reduce the overall Operations and 
Support costs of the STM, so it is critical that early design work stresses the objectives of 
maintainability. 
                                                 
19 Thomas Callies, Launching Systems Program Manager at BAE Systems, conversation with author, 
January 15, 2014 
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2. Acquisition Quantity 
The total quantity of STMs acquired will be a key consideration in the estimation 
of both initial acquisition and follow-on Operations and Support Costs. To determine the 
required quantity of Aegis-configured STMs required to support the CONOPS developed 
in Chapter III, the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 
2014 was referred to. When the total number of active large surface combatants in each 
year is averaged, approximately 89 vessels will be active in the inventory each year 
between 2014 and 204320. Assuming two STMs are acquired per ship, with the addition 
of 22 more to be stored in forward areas in support of emergent testing or training, an 
initial acquisition quantity of 200 rounds is assumed. Under the further assumption that 
all foreign operators of the Aegis weapons system choose to acquire their own STMs, the 
21 foreign Aegis ships would add an additional 42 rounds to the total acquisition 
quantity21.  Thus, we assume a total procurement of 242 rounds if only the Aegis-
compatible STM is procured. 
Another acquisition quantity that must be considered is that of the Solid Rocket 
Motor. Its replacement will be a key cost driver for the overhaul cost following each 
firing event. To arrive at an initial acquisition quantity, an assumption will be made that 
one-third of all ships so equipped will conduct a firing event annually. One-third of the 
110 ships described above would mean 37 firing events would occur annually, and thus, 
37 rocket motors would be required annually. Over a 30-year program lifespan, this 
would require 1,110 total rocket motors, again, if only the Aegis-configured STMs are 
procured.  
a. Acquisition Quantity Implications 
The overall acquisition quantity described here is extremely small 
compared to other missile programs. For example, the Standard Missile-6 is projected to 
                                                 
20 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for 
Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2014 (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, May 
2013), 5 
21 “Where in the World is Aegis?” Lockheed Martin, accessed April 7, 2014, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/aegis/where-in-the-world-is-aegis.html 
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have a final acquisition quantity of 1,200 rounds,22 while over 11,000 units of the 
Standard Missile-2 were acquired over its lifespan.23 The relatively small acquisition 
quantity has several distinct implications for the program and its associated costs. First, 
learning curve effects on acquisition unit cost will be greatly reduced. This will have the 
result of increasing the average unit cost for the total production run, as seen below in 
Figure 14. Secondly, non-recurring costs associated with the production of the STM, such 
as tooling and systems engineering efforts, would be spread out over fewer units, again 
increasing the average unit acquisition cost. Higher average unit costs contribute to 
higher costs per firing event, as shown in detail later in the chapter. The general effects of 
learning curves on average unit cost are shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Effect of total unit production on average unit cost assuming T1 of 
$1,600,000 and 90% learning curve. 
                                                 
22 DOD, Selected Acquisition Report: Standard Missile-6, 20 
23 U.S. Department of the Navy (DON), FY 2014 President’s Budget; Justification Book Volume 1; 
Weapons Procurement, Navy. (April 2013), 73. 
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As shown in Figure 14, when examining the learning curve’s effect on average 
unit costs, increasing the quantity from 242 to 1,000 results in average unit costs of 
roughly 20% less, assuming a conservative 90% learning curve. This was calculated 
using the equation YX=AX
B
, where YX is the cost of unit X, A is the T1, or first unit cost, 
and B is the slope of the learning curve. The T1 cost was arbitrarily assigned a value of 
$1,600,000, as this figure is simply to demonstrate the effect of learning curve and 
quantity on average unit cost. If a steeper learning curve were utilized, for instance 80%, 
which is not unfathomable for a complex article such as a missile, the cost savings per-
unit would increase to closer to 40%.  
B. STM COST ESTIMATION 
Estimation of the RDT&E and Acquisition costs will be done via the analogy 
method. The Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile was chosen as the analogous system for 
multiple reasons. First, it was developed in conjunction with 10 NATO partner countries. 
As the section on Acquisition Quantity Considerations makes clear, having the widest 
possible user base to increase the total acquisition quantity will realize tangible cost 
benefits. Second, like the proposed STM, the ESSM is readily configurable to operate 
with multiple combat systems, launching systems, and guidance systems.24 This, again, is 
critical to expanding the potential user base for the STM, as it would allow the STM to be 
used on multiple current and future combat systems configurations. Finally, its size and 
weight are roughly comparable to the size and weight of the STM as currently 
envisioned. The relevant specifications for the ESSM are described in Table 16. 
 
                                                 




Figure 15.  Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile launching from Mk 41 VLS.25 
 
Table 16.   Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Specifications26 
                                                 
25 “Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile,” Raytheon Corporation, accessed April 21, 2014, 
http://www.raytheon.com/newsroom/rtnwcm/groups/public/documents/image/rms_rtn_essm_pic04.jpg. 
26 “Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile” Aeroweb, accessed April 27, 2014, https://www.bga-
aeroweb.com/Defense/RIM-162-ESSM.html 
Guidance System: Raytheon semi-active on continuous wave or interrupted continuous wave illumination
Warhead: Annular blast fragmentation warhead, 90 lbs (40.5 kg)
Length: 12 ft (3.64 m)
Diameter: 10 in (25.4 cm)
Weight: 622 lbs (282 kg)
Speed: Mach 4+
Range: 27+ nm/31+ miles (50+ km)
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1. RDT&E Costs 
The total U.S. contribution to the ESSM program’s RDT&E from its inception to 
the Full Rate Production decision in 2004 was approximately $382 million. This cost 
includes Product Development, Support, Test and Evaluation, and Management. This 
represents a good starting point to estimate the cost of RDT&E for the STM. Of this 
figure, approximately $169 or 45% of the total RDT&E costs were expended on primary 
hardware development.27 For the STM, without a traditional terminal-phase seeker or 
warhead, it is assumed that costs would be correspondingly lower than a missile with 
those components. A common heuristic is that seeker costs approximately account for 
35% of the cost of missile procurement, while the warhead accounts for approximately 
10%.28 Assuming these costs translate with some approximate accuracy to the hardware 
development portion of the RDT&E phase, a net savings of 45%, or $93 million dollars 
would result. This, however, fails to account for the novel technology that would be 
required to be developed for the STM, such as the various components of recovery 
system. Due to this, a more conservative assumption is that the primary hardware 
development of RDT&E would be anywhere from 15 to 25% less expensive. Choosing 
the midpoint, 20%, gives an estimate of $151 million for the primary hardware 
development, and a total RDT&E cost of $364 million. 
Another area of RDT&E costs in which the unique capabilities of the STM might 
bear some cost savings would be in the OPEVAL/TECHEVAL/Test Firings category. 
This accounted for $7 million of the total cost of preparing the ESSM for its full rate 
production decision.29 It would be reasonable to assume that using a fully recoverable 
missile would reduce this expense by at least half, as test vehicles would be recovered 
after each flight, and thus there would be no need for prototypes that are expended with 
each test. Obviously, with a traditional missile, every test firing results in the loss of the 
test vehicle, whereas with the STM the cost would be limited to early stage overhaul 
                                                 
 27 U.S. Department of the Navy (DON), FY 2006 Budget Estimates; Justification of Estimates; 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy (Washington, DC: DON, February 2005). (FY05 to 
FY14 using JIC Calculator and RDTE index.) 
28 Daniel Nussbaum, e-mail to author, April 22, 2014 
29 DON, FY 2006 Budget Estimates, (FY05 to FY14 using JIC Calculator and RDTE index) 
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costs and accounting for any failures that may occur. This would reduce the cost of total 
RDT&E by a further $3.5 million, to approximately $360.5 million.  
2. Acquisition Costs 
Between the full rate production decision in 2004 and 2010, 388 Aegis-configured 
ESSMs were acquired at an average unit cost of approximately $795,500. In 2014, an 
additional 26 were purchased at an average unit cost of approximately $968,000.30 The 
reason for the 22% price increase is not given in the source documents, but is likely a 
combination of a relatively low production rate and a lack of production for a span of 
four years that would disrupt any incurred learning curve savings. Labor or material price 
increases could also have played a role. Due to this, only the first 388 will be examined to 
determine the potential T1 cost of the ESSM. In addition to these 388 Aegis-configured 
rounds, 222 rounds were purchased for use in the Mk 29 launcher at an average unit cost 
of $721,878, and a further 18 were produced with X-band terminal guidance capability at 
an average unit cost of $837,000.31 As with the Aegis-configured rounds, only those 
procured prior to FY12 will be examined due to unexplained price increases for both 
additional variants. Thus, a total of 628 ESSMs were procured through FY12 at an 
average unit cost of $770,609. 
To determine the approximate T1 of Aegis-configured ESSMs, a program was 
constructed using Microsoft Excel’s Solver add-in. The objective function set the average 
of 628 cells to a value of $770,609. The first cell was set as the variable cell, and the only 
constraint was the non-negativity of the variable cell. Each cell after the first, variable, 
cell referenced it via the equation Yx=AX
B
, where A was the set as the value of the first 
cell. For B, a 90 percent learning curve was assumed, as this represents a somewhat 
conservative value for production of a missile system.32 Thus, in this formulation, B = 
LOG(0.9)/LOG(2). When solved using the Simplex LP method, the resulting T1 value 
was $1,742,913. 
                                                 
30 DON, FY 2014 President’s Budget, 142. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Daniel Nussbaum, conversation with author, April 22, 2014 
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Using this value, it is possible to make assumptions regarding the approximate 
cost of the T1 for the STM, and from that estimate an average cost for any number of 
STM acquisitions. Using the heuristic used in section 1, it can be assumed that the TDD 
and the warhead together account for approximately 45% of this cost. Again, allowing for 
the cost of the recovery subsystems, but assuming that they will be less expensive that 
construct than either the TDD or the warhead once design work is finalized, a 
conservative estimate of 30% reduction in cost seems reasonable. Thus, our estimate for 
the T1 cost for the STM is $1,220,039. Assuming a 90% learning curve, the average unit 
production cost of 242 STMs is about $622,374, whereas an acquisition quantity of 1000 
or more has an average unit production cost of about $502,865. 
In addition to the round itself, the canister must be considered if the STM is to be 
used for Aegis ships configured with the Mk 41 VLS. As discussed in Chapter IV, 
various alternatives are available, and cost will depend on the selected alternative. Further 
complicating matters, existing canisters may require significant modification both to 
improve their maintainability and to adapt them to use with the STM.  That said, it is 
possible to provide a rough estimate of the approximate cost per canister. When last 
acquired in 2011, Mk 13 canisters cost approximately $109,000 per unit in FY11 dollars. 
This cost was likely inflated due to the fact that only 8 canisters were acquired in that 
year, resulting in a low production rate price penalty.33 Nevertheless, an approximate 
average unit cost of $100,000, assuming an acquisition quantity of greater than 242 and 
limited modification requirements, seems reasonable to use going forward. Non-Aegis 
configured STMs used, for example, to emulate an ESSM and fired from a Mk 29 
launcher, would not incur this cost.  
a. Program Acquisition Unit Cost 
Folding in the cost of RDT&E as well as that of acquisition of the STM and its 
canister, an approximate programmatic unit cost can be estimated. The same 90% 
learning curve and T1 of $1,220,039 are assumed. The cost of each unit is increased by 
                                                 
33 U.S. Department of the Navy, FY 2013 President’s Budget; Justification Book Volume 1; Weapons 
Procurement, Navy. (Washington, DC: DON, February 2012), 61 
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$100,000 to account for the cost of the canister. Finally, the total estimated cost of 
RDT&E, $360.5 million, was added in, then divided by the total number of units acquired 
to arrive at the estimated PAUC. 
 
Figure 16.  Estimated STM Program Acquisition Unit Costs 
Figure 16 shows that at the minimum quantity of 242 assumed for an Aegis-only 
configuration, the PAUC is approximately $2,212,000. This cost declines rapidly as 
additional units are purchased, reaching a PAUC of less than $1,000,000 at a total 
acquisition quantity of roughly 900 total units. At 1200 total units, the PAUC decreases 
to only $890,000. 
3. Operations and Support Cost Estimation 
As mentioned in Section 1, the O&S costs of the STM consist of both Firing and 
Overhaul costs. Both are highly variable, and have numerous cost components. To assist 
in estimating O&S costs of the STM, only the overhaul costs will be considered, and 
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replacement, canister overhaul, and maintenance. Each of these costs will be incurred 
each and every time an STM is fired, and the total annual cost will be dependent on the 
number of firing events conducted that year. Other costs will be incurred, such as 
transportation and losses due to attrition or failure, but those will be deferred to a more 
comprehensive cost estimate.  
The replacement of the Solid Rocket Motor is expected to be the most expensive 
single replacement item for the overhaul of the STM itself. All other components would 
be designed to have a lifespan of multiple flights, but the motor itself would need 
replacement. To estimate the cost incurred, one of the most likely vendors, ATK Inc, was 
contacted. Their estimate is approximately $25,000 to $40,000, depending on the quantity 
acquired and the production rate, for a 10-inch diameter rocket motor with similar 
specifications to that used on the ESSM or NSSM, both of which are manufactured by 
ATK.34 For the purposes of this thesis, the midpoint of these estimates will be used, a 
cost of approximately $32,500 for each motor. 
 
Figure 17.  Mk 58 Solid Rocket Motor for NSSM35 
The next major cost factor is the overhaul/reconditioning of the launch canister. 
Again, the contractor likely to be responsible for the overhaul, BAE Systems Land and 
Armaments Division, was contacted for an estimated cost. The cost of overhauling used 
                                                 
34 James Agosti, e-mail to author, August 22, 2013. 
35 Ibi.d 
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Mk 13 canisters runs between $30,000 and $50,000, and is highly dependent on the 
condition of the canister when received.36 For the purposes of this thesis, it is assumed 
that the canister overhaul will be streamlined such that the canister is rapidly transported 
to the overhaul facility, and thus the lowest cost in the range, $30,000, is incurred.  
Finally, the cost associated with each STM overhaul maintenance event is 
considered. This would consist of the cost to inspect, overhaul, mate the STM with the 
overhauled canister, and conduct final QA checks prior to shipment. As such, it is the 
hardest cost to estimate. Additionally, whether this maintenance is performed on contract 
or by Navy personnel will have major cost implications in terms of manpower costs. As a 
rough estimate, a cost of $20,000 will be assumed. This would include labor, special tools 
or equipment used in inspection and overhaul, part replacement, and overhead for the 
facility utilized for the overhaul. This brings the total estimated cost for an overhaul to 
$82,500. 
4. Cost Per Flight 
Unlike a traditional missile, the cost to fire the STM is not simply its acquisition 
cost. It is the acquisition cost, plus the overhaul cost for each flight, divided by the total 
number of flights. The PAUC is used as the acquisition cost, and the figure of $82,500 
was used for the overhaul cost. The PAUC was varied for different acquisition quantity 
scenarios. The calculated average cost per flight is displayed as a curve in Figures 18, 19, 
and 20. 
                                                 
36 Thomas Callies, conversation with author, January 15, 2014. 
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Figure 18.  Cost Per Flight for total acquisition quantity of 242 STMs 
As Figure 18 demonstrates, assuming a minimum acquisition of 242, for a total 
PAUC of $2,212,000, the cost per flight event rapidly drops, dropping below a per-flight 
cost of $300,000 at the 10
th
 flight event before dropping further to $200,000 per flight at 
the 18
th
 flight event. This represents approximately one-fifth the current total cost of an 
ESSM. Assuming a greater acquisition quantity results in an even more marked cost 
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Figure 19.  Cost Per Flight for total acquisition quantity of 500 STMs 
If the total acquisition quantity is increased to 500, as depicted in Figure 19, the 
total cost per flight event drops below $200,000 after only 12 flights, and drops to 
roughly one-sixth the cost of an ESSM with WDC after 25 flights. Even if the cost per 
overhaul was increased to a value of $100,000, the cost per flight would still fall to 
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Figure 20.  Cost Per Flight for total acquisition quantity of 1,000 STMs 
Finally, if the assumed total acquisition quantity is set to 1,000 STMs, as depicted 
in Figure 20, the cost per firing is reduced to $200,000 after only 8 flights, and drops to 
$125,000 after 23 flights, less than one-eighth the cost of an ESSM with WDC. 
C. STM APPLICATIONS 
This chapter should make abundantly clear the importance of both leveraging the 
existing NATO Sea Sparrow coalition of nations as well as maximizing the applicability 
of the STM to reduce costs associated with RDT&E and acquisition. Although the 
majority of this report has focused on the Aegis-configured STM, other variants are 
possible and should be pursued in conjunction with the development of the Aegis round. 
Ideally, there would be as few physical differences as possible between rounds 
configured for use with Aegis and other combat systems. Potential missiles that the STM 
could emulate for the purpose of readiness verification or crew proficiency included the 
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launching and control systems, and both of which are widely used by both U.S. and 
foreign militaries. The Patriot Missile System would be another obvious system to 
leverage, reaping the benefits of Joint development and further sharing development 
costs. Future configurations could support both the Zumwalt and Ford-class X-band 
guidance radars, as well as emerging foreign systems such as PAAMS. 
D. SUMMARY 
The results of the foregoing analysis indicate that significant cost savings are 
possible with the STM when compared to other missile types. This result is dependent on 
the assumptions made throughout the chapter. Specifically, if developed in conjunction 
with foreign militaries and designed to be as widely configurable as possible, the STM is 
an affordable option for increasing both readiness and proficiency. The cost estimation 
suggests a cost of between one-third and one-eighth the cost of an ESSM per firing event, 
depending on the total number of STMs acquired, the overhaul cost incurred for each 
firing event, and the number of flights conducted with each airframe. It is important to 
note that the cost estimation performed here is superficial in nature due to the conceptual 
nature of the STM. The costs associated with developing and fielding the STM could 
change significantly based on decisions made in design and requirements.  
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The preceding discussion and analysis preliminarily indicate that the STM 
concept is feasible to the extent that can be determined in a report of this scope. 
Additionally, given the assumptions made during the cost estimation of the STM, it 
appears that the STM will be cost effective when compared to use of missiles such as the 
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile for proficiency or readiness evaluation. This chapter 
examines the benefits derived from the use of the STM and proposes recommendations 
for further program development and study. 
A. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
As detailed in Chapter VI, based on the underlying assumptions, the STM is 
estimated to have a programmatic cost per firing event of between $125,000 and 
$330,000. This number is ultimately dependent on the sharing of RDT&E costs, the total 
procurement quantity, and the number of flight events each round ultimately conducts.  
When compared to the acquisition cost of the ESSM, this range represents a cost savings 
of between 87.5% and 67%. Compared to the legacy SM-2 rounds in inventory, the cost 
savings is not as dramatic. However, it is important to note that the firing of the STM 
does not deplete available inventories of either ESSM or SM-2. This is critical, as the 
SM-2 is no longer being procured.  
It is also important to note that firing of the STM can never replace live missile 
firing events, as it is important that performance data for the actual missiles is acquired so 
that the missile performance can be characterized. Firing events utilizing ESSM and SM 
variants will still need to be regularly conducted to evaluate the performance of the 
missile against threat-representative targets and generate an estimated probability of kill 
for the seeker/warhead configuration tested. There is no reason why firing events 
conducted solely for proficiency require the use of an actual missile. Rather, the precise 
number of actual missile firing events required to calculate the performance 
characteristics of that missile over time within a reasonable confidence interval should be 
determined. Firing events beyond this number can then be assigned as STM events. 
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The cost/benefit analysis of the STM is reinforced by an examination of firing 
event objectives. Enclosure four of COMPACFLTINST/COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 
3590.12 lists 48 data collection points for ESSM firings, and 49 for a firing event 
utilizing an SM-2. Of these, all but two would be achieved with an STM firing. These are 
the fuse performance of the missile and the realized miss distance.37 With an STM’s 
limited terminal performance due to a design bias toward target avoidance, the realized 
miss distance would be greater than that of a missile employing terminal homing 
guidance.  This should trigger an automated “No Kill” alert from the combat system, as 
the target continues inbound and the missile begins its post-intercept maneuvering. 
Additionally, with no warhead, no fuzing data can be gathered. This data would have to 
be collected during missile performance firings. Despite these limitations, a plethora of 
valuable data about the firing unit’s combat system will be gathered. Key data points 
include: weapon system automated kill evaluation assessment; Fire Control System 
performance; overall missile performance; initial target detection range from firing unit; 
and target lock-on range from firing unit.  
In addition to these data points, the STM will gather additional data above and 
beyond the required data collection. This would include the frequency and amplitude of 
received terminal guidance, both rear-reference and reflected from the target. 
Additionally, the amplitude, frequency, and time of receipt for missile uplink commands 
would be recorded. By making allowances for additional growth weight and space in the 
initial design, further data gathering would be possible utilizing future technologies.  
Overall, the STM would allow collection of 95% of required data collection 
points at a fraction of the cost of an ESSM and without depleting the inventories of the 
ESSM or SM-2 unnecessarily. Additionally, a readiness and proficiency benefit would be 
realized through watchstander experience gained during the firing exercise, as well as 
through performance of pre- and post-fire maintenance checks. For these reasons, 
pursuing the further development of the STM has the potential to provide benefit to the 
fleet while reducing expenditure on live firing exercises. 
                                                 
37 Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, COMPACFLTINST/COMUSFLTFORCOMINST 3590.12, Data 
Collection and Reporting of Surface Missile System Missile Firing Exercises, May 16, 2013, Encl (4). 
 91 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that the STM concept be considered for further development 
and potential initiation as a program of record. Further study should be conducted on the 
feasibility of the functional solutions investigated in Chapter IV. Additional work needs 
to be done by experienced engineers on determining the number of flights possible from 
an airframe, and finding ways to extend the lifespan and increase the maintainability of 
the STM. The cost estimate detailed in Chapter VII would benefit from an independent 
review and further cost estimation efforts based on parametric or engineering means. 
Further study should also focus on maximizing the compatibility of the STM 
concept. Using the ESSM as a model, it should be determined what hardware and 
software can be utilized to provide maximum compatibility across a range of in-service 
U.S. and foreign weapons systems. Design work should focus on determining what 
components would be applicable across the range of configurations, and which 
components, such as antennas, would need to be changed based on which combat system 
the STM is used with. This will allow a more detailed cost analysis that takes into 
account the required physical differences between configurations. Additionally, it will 
help to determine which configuration variants are worth pursuing, given the cost of 
modification balanced against the increase in the potential user base. 
Lessons learned from the detailed design of the STM could be applied to other 
current or future missile programs as well. The ability to design a missile for 
recoverability would benefit future development of missile systems, as it would allow 
recovery of some or all of the missile components following a live-fire test event. This 
would not only reduce the cost of conducting repeated test events that do not aim to test 
the fuzing or warhead performance, it would also allow test engineers to more accurately 
determine causes of test failure. For example, instead of just noting an intercept failure 
due to excessive miss distance, engineers would be able to examine the seeker head and 
determine physical causes of component failure. Such prototypes could be retained and 
used to validate software or hardware updates throughout the program life cycle.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
In closing, the STM represents a novel means of increasing readiness without 
incurring prohibitive cost. As the Navy seeks to chart a course through the coming years 
of budget contraction, fleet readiness must be preserved to maintain the viability of our 
surface combatants. The STM may only provide a modest contribution toward this goal, 
but every means available to preserve our fighting ability and continue to improve the 
training and thus readiness of our personnel should be examined and utilized.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Bleed-off   Aerodynamically reducing airspeed through drag or gravity 
Command Destruct  Aegis function that orders self-destruct of missile in flight 
Dogbox   Area designated as danger zone for missile firing exercise.  
DTT    Synthetic target generated by AN/SPY-1 computer 
Non-Organic Asset  Any asset that is not a part of the ship or group 
Porpoising Phenomenon where missile propels itself repeatedly into 
and out of the water. 
Watchstander   Personnel standing watch in specific role 
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